Federal Preemption of State and Local Law Concerning Aviation Noise
Concerning Aviation Noise
By Howard Beckman
(All rights to publication are reserved by the author. Republication of all or any
(Revised Nov. 17, 2016)
Federal preemption is a defense to a claim filed in state court. In essence, the defense argument is that the state law is in conflict with federal law and thus the complaint should be heard in federal court or dismissed because the state has no authority to set the remedies requested (injunctive relief or compensatory damages). "Complete preemption" is a jurisdictional concept; it has to do with the ability of a state court to hear a case. "Conflict preemption" relates to the merits of the claim.
"Conflict preemption" can be total or partial. The ultimate question in any preemption inquiry is whether the Congress intended that the federal government should have exclusive control over a certain field or area of law. Courts often speak of Congress "occupying the field (of law)", and thus total preemption is sometimes called "field preemption". The field deemed preempted may be narrowly or broadly defined.
In addition, a federal statute may expressly provide for exceptions to preemption. Thus the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 has a savings clause: "Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies." (Pub.L. 85-276, 72 Stat. 31, codified 49 USC 40120(c).) (This provision was amended in 1994 to read: "A remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law." See Pub.L. 103-272, §1(e), 108 Stat. 1117.)
A conclusion of total preemption is based on the finding that a federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that Congress left no room for the states or local government. A conclusion of partial preemption leaves the door open to state or local government regulation.
Finally, a claim based on state law can raise substantial questions of federal law; that is, the claim is said to "arise under" federal law. (Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives the federal courts power to hear cases "arising under" federal statutes.) While federal courts clearly have subject matter jurisdiction over claims created by a federal statute, the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that a case may arise under federal law "where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983). In such situations a state law-based action is converted into a federal action. City of Tipp v. City of Dayton (see "Cases" below) offers an example of this type of "preemption".
For a comprehensive list and discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's classification of preemption cases, see S. Candice Hoke, "Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values" (1991) under "Literature" below. The following opinions contain good discussions of federal preemption of actions related to airport noise:
Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 1996 (6th Cir. Ct. App., 76 F.3d 778)
State of Minnesota v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 1994 (Minn. Supreme Ct., 507 N.W.2d 19)
All of the opinions cited here were issued after enactment of the Noise Control Act of 1972 (see "Federal Statutes" below) and the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 opinion in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.. Opinions before Burbank have limited, if any, precedential value on the question of preemption of the areas of interest here.
(1) Preemption Found
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. (1973, U.S. Supreme Ct.) City's ordinance imposing curfew on takeoffs to control noise is preempted by the federal Noise Control Act of 1972. (411 U.S. 624, 36 L.Ed.2d 547, 93 S.Ct. 1854)
City of Tipp City v. City of Dayton (2001, U.S. Dist. Ct., SD Ohio) A state law-based noise nuisance claim, which alleges that air traffic control tower procedures were not implemented, "arises under" federal law insofar as the procedures were memorialized in Tower Orders that appear to have the force of an FAA regulation, and thus the claim should be heard by a federal court. (204 F.R.D. 388)
County of Cook v. Preister (1974, Ill. App. Ct.) A county regulation that restricted aircraft over a certain weight from using airport is preempted. (22 Ill. App. 3d 964)
Gary Leasing, Inc. v. Town Board of the Town of Bethlehem (1985, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Niagra Co.) Ordinances limiting the number of aircraft based at a private airport and imposing a curfew on flights from the airport are preempted. (127 Misc. 2d 194, 485 N.Y.S.2d 693)
Harrison v. Schwartz (1990, Md. Ct. App.) A local ordinance imposing curfews and limitations on landing patterns is preempted. (319 Md. 360, 572 A.2d 528)
Krueger v. Mitchell (1983, Wisc. Supreme Ct.) A private cause of action seeking to enjoin flights over plaintiff's business is preempted. No preemption was found in a separate issue (see list below). (112 Wis.2d 88, 332 N.W.2d 733)
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee et al. (1975, 7th Cir. Ct. App.) County's action to abate airport noise by establishing flight patterns, air traffic corridors, noise control standards, and rules governing emissions is preempted. (521 F.2d 387)
National Helicopter Corp. of America v. City of New York et al. (1998, 2d Cir. Ct. App.) Some aspects of a city zoning ordinance restricting helicopter operations are preempted by federal aviation law but others are not. (137 F.3d 81)
Northeast Phoenix Homeowners' Ass'n v. Scottsdale Municipal Airport (1981, Ariz. App. Ct.) Action by city-owner of airport limiting flight operations and imposing curfew on flights is preempted. Courts cannot order airports to do what the airports are prohibited from doing because of preemption, i.e., preemption extends to injunctive relief. (130 Ariz. 487, 636 P.2d 1269)
Price v. Charter Township (1995, U.S. District Ct., ED Mich.) A local ordinance limiting frequency of flights is preempted. (909 F. Supp. 498)
San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco (1981, 9th Cir. Ct. App.) Enforcement of California's airport noise regulatory scheme against an airport is preempted according to the holding of Burbank. But see Air Transportation Assn. of America v. Crotti (no preemption of the regulatory scheme per se). (651 F.2d 1306)
State of Minnesota v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n (1994, Minn. Supreme Ct.) The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency's noise standards as applied to the Metropolitan Airports Commission are preempted by federal law. The court reverses the state appellate court, disagreeing with that court's intepretation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. (1973). See the appellate court opinion and see Air Transportation Assn. of America v. Crotti (no preemption of California's airport noise regulatory scheme per se). (520 N.W.2d 388)
Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, (1975, Super. Ct. N.J., App. Div.) An order limiting times of flights is preempted. (135 N.J. Super. 529, 343 A.2d 793)
United States v. City of Berkeley (1990, U.S. District Ct., ED Mo.) Ordinance directly in conflict with FAA's express authority to regulate air navigation facilities. (735 F. Supp. 937)
Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago (1973, Ill. Ct. App.) A nuisance action seeking to impose maximum noise levels is preempted. (16 Ill. App. 3d 733)
(2) No Preemption Found
Air Transportation Assn. of America v. Crotti (1975, U.S. District Ct., ND Calif.) California's airport noise regulatory scheme, per se, is not preempted by federal aviation law and thus not invalid. However, the court left open the question whether some application of the law would be preempted. This very issue later came before the 9th Circuit Court in San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco (enforcement is preempted). (521 F.2d 387)
Alaska Airlines et al. v. City of Long Beach et al. (1990, 9th Cir. Ct. App.) City ordinance designed to abate aircraft noise (reducing the number of permitted daily carrier flights) is not preempted by federal aviation law because it is a valid exercise of its proprietary powers. (951 F.2d 977)
Arapahoe Co. Public Airport Auth. v. Centennial Express (1998, Colo. Supreme Ct.) Airport's ban on scheduled passenger service is not preempted by federal aviation law because it is a valid exercise of its proprietary powers. (956 P.2d 587)
Arrow Air, Inc. v. Port Auth. of NY and NJ (1985, U.S. District Ct., SD N.Y.) The Authority's aircraft noise regulations prohibited a "stage 1" aircraft from using its airport, even though the FAA had issued a waiver from federal restrictions for the aircraft. Held: enforcement of the Authority's regulations are not preempted by federal aviation law. The Aviation Safety Noise Abatement Act of 1979 does not limit an airport proprietor's rights to promulgate noise regulations.
Baker et al. v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985, Calif. Supreme Ct.) Federal preemption of local regulation of airport noise is not absolute. In fact, the Authority is required by legislative act creating it to "pursue all reasonable avenues available to insure that the adverse effects of noise are being mitigated to the greatest extent reasonably possible." "Airport operations are the quintessential continuing nuisance. Although federal law precluding interference in any way with flight patterns and schedules adds an element of permanency to an otherwise continuing problem, it does not mandate that the overall nuisance is a permanent one. Thus plaintiffs may elect whether to treat airport noise and vibrations as a continuing or as a permanent nuisance." (39 Cal.3d 862, 218 Cal.Rptr. 293, 705 P.2d 866)
Bieneman v. City of Chicago (1988, 7th Cir. Ct. App.) "Illinois has some role ... in governing the amount of noise and pollution that escapes from O'Hare [Airport]." Thus the state's damages remedies are not preempted where they "enforce federal [aviation] requirements" or "regulate aspects of airport operations over which the state has discretionary authority." (864 F.2d 463)
British Airways Bd. v. Port Authority of NY & NJ (1977, 2d Cir. Ct. App.) The Authority temporarily banned landing of the supersonic Concorde at its airport, although the Secretary of Transportation had ordered the FAA to allow the aircraft to operate at U.S. airports in a 16-month operational test. The trial court ruled that the Secretary's order preempted the Authority's power to abate, through its temporary ban, the noise generated by the Concorde during landings and take-offs. The 2d Circuit reverses: "The Congress provided for the promulgation by airport proprietors of reasonable regulations to establish acceptable noise levels for the airfield and its environs." (558 F.2d 75)
Broadbent v. Allison (2001, U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. No. Carolina) Plaintiff brought an action in state court for nuisance arising from the recent establishment of a general aviation airport next to his home in a rural area. Defendant removed the case to federal court on the grounds that federal law preempted any state law governing the case. The federal district court, relying on Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus (see below), ruled that the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt the plaintiff's action in state law. (155 F.Supp.2d 520)
Casey et al. v. Goulian et al. (2003, U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Mass.) State-law claims for nuisance caused by stunt flying are not preempted by federal aviation law. (273 F.Supp.2d 136) (For information on this dispute see Stop the Noise. See also the joint settlement statement.)
City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1999, Cal. Ct. App.) No preemption of state statute establishing local procedures for regulating purchase of land for airport use. "Local governments retain their power to regulate land use, even with regard to safety and noise control, so long as it does not touch upon the control of aircraft or airspace." "The FAA has the sole authority to regulate the use of airspace .... [This authority] does not extend to regulation of ground facilities." (72 Cal.App.4th 366, 85 Cal.Rtpr.2d 28)
City of Cleveland v. City of Brook Park (1995, U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ohio) Cleveland planned to expand runways of its airport into Brook Park. Subsequently Brook Park revised its zoning ordinances to require a discretionary conditional use permit for construction of new runways. Held: the zoning ordinance is not preempted by FAA regulations because it does not directly regulate flight operations of aircraft. (893 F.Supp. 742)
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft (1993, 10th Cir. Ct. App.) Cleveland sued Piper for injuries he received when his Piper-made airplane crashed during takeoff. The court ruled that Cleveland's claims were not preempted by federal aviation law. "We conclude that Congress has not indicated a 'clear and manifest' intent to occupy the field of airplane safety to the exclusion of state common law. To the contrary, it appears ... that Congress has intended to allow state common law to stand side by side with the system of federal regulations it has developed." (985 F.2d 1438)
Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul (1990, 8th Cir. Ct. App.) City denied Condor a permit to use property for a heliport for helicopter services. Held: A city's regulatory power over land use does not conflict with the federal regulation of airspace and thus the city's action is not preempted by federal law. (912 F.2d 215)
Emerald Development Co. v. McNeill (2003, Ark. Ct. App.) Court affirms injunction against building an airport close to another another airport on the grounds that the new airport would be a nuisance. The court finds no federal preemption of its ability to issue an injunction since it is not engaged in regulation of airspace but in the regulation of land use. That is, the location of the new airport interferes with the rights of the owners of the existing, nearby airport. (120 S.W.3d 605)
Faux-Burhans v. County Commissioners (1987, U.S. District Ct., D. Md.) Local ordinance regulating take-off distance, setbacks, types of flights, and intensity of airport use is not preempted by Noise Control Act. (674 F.Supp. 1172)
Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay (1978, N.J. Supreme Ct.) Plaintiff sought to construct a heliport near a heavily traveled thoroughfare opposite a residential neighborhood. Ordinance prohibiting heliports in the area in order to protect the "general quality of life" is not preempted by federal aviation regulation. (390 A.2d 1177)
Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979, Calif. Supreme Court) A nuisance cause of action arising from aircraft noise is not preempted by federal regulation of aviation. (26 Cal.3d 86, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329)
Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus (1996, 6th Cir. Ct. App.) City ordinances prohibiting the operation of seaplanes on the surface of a lake are not preempted by federal aviation law. (76 F.3d 778)
Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake (2005, 7th Cir. Ct. App.) The Indiana town had amended its zoning ordinance to get rid of a privately operated heliport on the grounds that the helicopter takeoffs and landings were a public nuisance. The heliport owners sued the town. The court held that the town was not preempted by federal aviation law from enacting a zoning ordinance regulating aircraft, landing strips, pads, and spaces. "The siting of an airfield so long as it does not interefere with existing [air] traffic patterns, etc. remains an issue for local control." (415 F.3d 693).
In Re Commercial Airfield (2000, Vermont) A crop duster base in Vermont claimed that it was not required to obtain a state permit for certain expansions of its facilities and operations, arguing that federal law preempted such state regulation. The court concluded that a state permit was necessary, because "the federal government has not pervasively occupied the field of land-use regulations relating to aviation." (752 A.2d 13)
Krueger v. Mitchell (1983, Wisc. Supreme Ct.) An airport operating in conformance with state and federal law may nevertheless constitute a nuisance, and the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt damages for unreasonable noise from an airport. (112 Wis.2d 88, 332 N.W.2d 733)
Kupster Realty Corp. v. State of New York (1978, Ct. of Claims of N.Y.) The state is not preempted by federal aviation law from imposing avigation easements on land adjacent to an airport. Held: "[W]hile the airspace above the F.A.A. airport landing and takeoff approach surfaces ... is part of the federal navigable airspace, and thus part of the federal public domain ..., the federal government has evidently decided not to fully preempt its rights of control therein. A possible reason for this federal reticence is that a full federal preemption would most likely subject the federal government to the inverse condemnation suits currently brought against local airport owners, or require it to appropriate avigation easements like the ones here. Aside from the expense, such suits or appropriations would lead to what could be considered an excessive federal involvement in matters more properly resolved by local authorities. Whatever the reason, we think the conclusion that the subject regulations did not directly restrict private landowners is consistent with evident federal intent and policy." (404 N.Y.S.2d 225)
National Helicopter Corp. of America v. City of New York et al. (1998, 2d Cir. Ct. App.) Some aspects of a city zoning ordinance restricting helicopter operations are not preempted by federal aviation law but others are. (137 F.3d 81)
Parachutes, Inc. v. Township of Lakewood (1972, N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) The township adopted an ordinance prohibiting sound over 50 decibels at night and 60 decibels during the day. Plaintiffs operated a sport parachuting center at an airport within the township. This operation required pilots to stop the airplane's engine in mid air over the airport just before a parachutist jumps, and to restart the engine after the jump. The noise from the repeated starting of engines, which continued from morning until dark, violated the township's ordinance. Parachutes, Inc. challenged the ordinance, claiming in part that it was preempted by federal law. The trial court ruled the ordinance was not preempted by federal law, and the appellate court affirmed. Note: This case was decided before the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court case City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., which established the rule on preemption in matters of aircraft noise regulation following the Noise Control Act of 1972 (see above). (121 N.J. Super. 48, 296 A.2d 71).
People v. City of Chicago (2002, Ill. Ct. App. 2d Dist.) Requirement in state Aeronautics Act that owner of airport obtain a certificate from state Dept. of Transportation for airport expansion plan is not preempted by provisions of the Federal Aviation Act, Noise Control Act, or Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1994. (Case arose because state disagreed with Chicago's plans for expansion of O'Hare Airport.) (202 Ill.2d 36, 779 N.E.2d 875)
People v. Valenti (1984, Appellate Dept. Calif. Superior Ct.) State crime of dangerous and reckless flying is not preempted by federal aviation law. Held: "The state has the right to impose criminal sanctions for the unlawful operation of aircraft above its land and waters." (153 Cal.App.3d Supp. 38, 200 Cal.Rptr. 862)
Riggs v. Burson (1997, Tenn. Supreme Ct.) A state statute prohibiting use of land for a heliport within nine miles of a national park is not preempted by federal aviation law. (941 S.W.2d 44)
Sea Air NY, Inc. v. City of New York (2001, 2d Cir. Ct. App.) City's restriction on operation of seaplane sightseeing tours to reduce noise is not preempted. (250 F.3d 183)
Skysign Int'l, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu (2002, 9th Cir. Ct. App.) A local ordinance regulating aircraft-towed advertising banners is not preempted. In reaching its decision the court relied on a statement in the FAA's guidelines for preparing a "Certificate of Waiver" for banner towing (FAA Order 8700.1, Vol. 2, Chap. 45). The statement had conditioned the waiver on any "state and local ordinances that may prohibit or restrict banner tow operations." Following the court's decision the FAA deleted the statement (see FAA Notice N 8700.16, October 7, 2002). Thus the Skysign decision has no precedential value. (276 F.3d 1109)
Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club (2001, 7th Cir. Ct. App.) Owner of property near a small private airport filed a state-law trespass claim because of flights over his property. Defendants moved to remove the case to federal court. The appellate court concluded: "The question is whether, in enacting the Federal Aviation Act, Congress clearly intended completely to replace state law with federal law and create a federal forum, or, more likely, if it only intended to provide a federal defense to the application of state law. . . . In this case, we conclude that it is the latter." (272 F3d 398)
Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Pub.L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731) "to establish a new Federal agency with powers adequate to enable it to provide for the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace by both civil and military operations." (H.R.Rep. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3741.) The Act directed the Federal Aviation Agency to regulate "air commerce in such manner as to best promote its development and safety and fulfill the requirements of national defense." (Pub.L. No. 85-726, sec. 103.)
The Act contains a savings clause:
Noise Control Act of 1972
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq., amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The leading case on the Noise Control Act is Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973). Justice Douglas, writing for a 5-4 majority, conducted a detailed analysis of the Act and its legislative history and concluded that the "pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise" constituted preemption. (411 U.S. at 633, 93 S.Ct. at 1859.)
However, in a footnote Douglas expressly acknowledged that the court "do(es) not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor." (411 U.S. at 635-36 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. at 1161.) In 1976 the principle of the "proprietor's exception" was articulated by a U.S. District Court (see below).
The "proprietor's exception" is an important principle relating to federal aviation law's preemption of local authority to regulate airport operations. Because of preemption, cities, counties, and states are not able to regulate airport operations based on their "general police powers". They can regulate an airport, however, if they own the airport. This principle was first enunciated in National Aviation v. City of Hayward (U.S. District Ct., N.D. Cal. 1976; 418 F.Supp. 417)
In U.S. v. State of New York the court reasoned that a curfew imposed by the state pursuant to both its police and proprietary powers was entitled to analysis under the proprietor exception (U.S. District Ct., N.D. N.Y. 1982; 552 F.Supp 255, 264). This rule was adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in National Helicopter Corp. of America v. City of New York et al. (1998; 137 F.3d 81)
It is the FAA's position that the proprietor's exception applies only to actions where the airport owner is exposed to potential or actual liability for damages caused by noise from aircraft operations at the airport. See Director's Determination: In re. Naples Airport Authority (2003, FAA Docket 16-01-15), where the FAA concluded that the Authority was not entitled to claim the proprietor's exception for a ban on all stage-2 jets because it had not demonstrated potential or actual liability for damages due to stage-2 operations. Without the proprietor's exception the ban was preempted by federal law and thus constituted an unlawful exercise of police powers to regulate aircraft noise.
"Public controls on the use of land are commonly exercised by zoning. Zoning is a power reserved to the states under the U.S. Constitution. It is an exercise of the police powers of the states that designates the uses permitted on each parcel of land." (60 Federal Register 14701, March 20, 1995, regarding 14 CFR Part 150.)
"Our concept of the legal framework underlying this [aviation noise abatement] policy statement is that proprietors retain the flexibility to impose such restrictions if they do not violate any Constitutional proscription. We have been urged to undertake and have considered carefully and rejected full and complete federal preemption of the field of aviation noise abatement. In our judgment the control and reduction of airport noise must remain a shared responsibility among airport proprietors, users, and governments." (Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, November 18, 1976.)
"Aircraft Noise Abatement: Local versus National Control." 1970 Law & Soc. Order 678 (1970).
"An Airport's Reasonable Nondiscriminatory Noise Level Regulations Are Not Preempted by Federal Law." 18 Va. J. Int. Law 569-579 (1978).
Berg, David. "Proprietor's Rights: A Debate Preemption and Proprietary Powers: A Limited Exception." 15 Air Space Law J. 5 (2001).
Cole, Troy J., "Zoning Control of Airport Expansion by Host Cities and the Battle over Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport," 59 J. Air Law Comm. 193-237 (1993) This article describes in detail the interplay of the different land use controls of local, state, and federal jurisdictions when an airport expands into new planning jurisdictions. In particular it examines the issue of state law (Texas) and federal law preemption of local land use laws. Although the article focuses on one airport in one state by way of illustration, the legal issues are relevant to any U.S. airport.
"Concorde (British Airways Bd. v. Port Authority of NY & NJ) and Local Control of Airport Noise: Federal Preemption?" 13 New England Law Rev. 473-503 (1978).
"Don't Let Preemption Ground Your Aviation Case." Trial 43(3):36 (March 2007).
"Environmental Law Aircraft Noise Regulation Federal Preemption." 20 N.Y. Law Forum 165-176 (1974).
[Note] "Federal Preemption in Airport Noise Abatement Regulation: Allocation of Federal and State Power." 26 Maine Law Rev. 321-344 (1974).
[Note] "Federal Regulation under Federal Aviation Act and Noise Control Act Preempts the Field of Airport and Aircraft Noise Control Rendering Local Airport Curfews Invalid." 22 Univ. Kans. Law Rev. 319-336 (1974).
"Federal Statutory Preemption of State and Local Authority: History, Inventory, and Issues". Washington D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1992).
Gallagher, James A., and Michael J. Crowley. "How High Will It Fly? Federal Preemption in Aviation Litigation." For the Defense, Aug. 2004.
Goldstein, Marcia C. Note, "Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is There Room for Local Regulation?" 60 Cornell Law Rev. 269-298 (1975).
Hoke, S. Candice. "Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values." 71 Boston Univ. Law Rev. 685 (1991). Listing and discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's classification of preemption cases.
Jablonski, Barbara H. "Federal Preemption and Airport Noise Control." 8 Urban Law Ann. 229-239 (1974).
Katz, Judith. Note, "Federal Preemption of Local Airport Noise Regulation." 25 Cath. U. Law Rev. 580-600 (1976).
Muss, Joshua A. Comment. "Aircraft Noise: Federal Preemption of Local Control, Concorde and other Recent Cases." 43 J. Air Law Comm. 753-798 (1977).
Stein, Michael. [Note] "The Effect of the Federal Preemption of Noise Control and Air Pollution on Local Initiative: Can Prometheus Be Unbound?" 38 J. Air Law Comm. 427-436 (1972).
Strauss, David. [Case Note] "Federal Regulation of Aircraft Noise under Federal Aviation Act Precludes Local Police Power Noise Restrictions (City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal)." 15 Boston Coll. Ind. & Com. Law Rev. 848-862 (1974).
Tuegel, Donald W. [Note] "Airport Expansions: The Need for a Greater Federal Role." 54 Washington Univ. J. Urban Contemp. Law 291-319 (1998). -- Part IV has a good overview of federal case law and statutory preemption for new airport construction and expansion or modification of existing airports. The discussion illustrates the issues in preemption law applied to airports.
"Use of Local Police Powers to Impose Curfews on Air Flights is Preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as Amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972." 5 Rutgers Camden Law J. 566-584 (1974).