Introduction

Literature

Cases

FEDERAL

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. City of Los Angeles (1992) -- The airport is located in the jurisdiction of the City of Los Angeles. When the airport planned to extend a taxiway, the Los Angeles City Council enacted an ordinance that required the airport to submit any proposed development project to the City Planning Commission for prior review and approval. The court held: "[A] non-proprietor municipality may not exercise its police power to prohibit, delay, or otherwise condition the construction of runways and taxiways at a non-city-owned airport." "The problem with this Ordinance is that it conditions the construction and reconstruction of taxiways and runways on the prior approval of the City. This the City may not do. The proper placement of taxiways and runways is critical to the safety of takeoffs and landings and essential to the efficient management of the surrounding airspace. The regulation of runways and taxiways is thus a direct interference with the movements and operations of aircraft, and is therefore preempted by federal law." (9th Cir.; 979 F.2d 1338)

City of Blue Ash v. McLucas (1979) -- City, site of an airport owned by Cincinnati, sought a court order requiring the FAA to honor an agreement between the two cities that jet aircraft would not be allowed to use a new runway at the airport. The agreement was cited in the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the runway. After construction of the runway the FAA issued a notice that the airport was closed to jet aircraft "not meeting FAR 36 noise limits." The City demanded that the notice be changed to an unqualified statement that the airport is closed to jet aircraft, and the FAA refused. The City's suit alleged that the FAA's action violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The court held that, although the agreements were acknowledged in the EIS, there was no violation of NEPA. Moreover, the court said, because the FAA was not a party to the agreements between the cities, it was not a proper defendant. In order to enforce the agreement, plaintiff should take action against Cincinnati (in fact, such a suit was filed in state court). (6th Cir.; 596 F.2d 709)

City of Bridgeton v. Slater (2000) -- One issue in this case was the requirement in the Airport and Airway Improvement Act requiring the FAA to determine that an airport project is consistent with the plans of local jurisdictions before it can award money for the project. In its long-running battle with St. Louis over expansion of St. Louis International Airport, Bridgeton adopted an ordinance effectively blocking expansion of the airport. The court concluded that the Act requires only "reasonable consistency" between a project and local zoning plans, not perfect consistency with the plans of every affected municipality. (8th Cir.; 212 F.3d 448)

Note: Shortly after this decision, a Missouri appellate court confirmed that Bridgeton lacked authority under state law to block expansion of the St. Louis airport; see City of Bridgeton v. City of St. Louis, April 2000.

City of Cleveland v.City of Brook Park (1995) -- The City of Cleveland sued the City of Brook Park, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Cleveland sought a declaratory judgment that certain of Brook Park's ordinances offend both the supremacy clause and the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and an injunction against the enforcement of these ordinances. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Brook Park's motion for summary judgment was granted and Cleveland's motion for summary judgment was denied. (N.D. Ohio; 893 F.Supp. 742)

City of New Orleans v. City of Kenner (1992) -- New Orleans planned to expand its airport, part of which is situated within Kenner. The Kenner City Council adopted a resolution that precluded any expansion of the airport without the express approval of Kenner. New Orleans filed for declaratory relief. Held: New Orleans' contract with the FAA (consequent to receiving funds from the FAA) did not allow New Orleans to ignore or circumvent any local government with jurisdiction over the ground on which expansion would take place. (The issue here, whether an airport can expand without the approval of any local jurisdictions in which the airport is located, is at the heart of the dispute between the City of Burbank and the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport -- see California appellate court cases.) (E.D. La., unpublished decision, Jan. 28, 1992; vacated Aug. 6, 1992 without statement, 971 F.2d 748)

CALIFORNIA

City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority -- The City of Burbank and the Authority have been fighting for several years over the Authority's plans to expand the airport into Burbank, against the City's will. In this case the City of Burbank challenges the power of the Airport Authority to expand into the city without the city's approval. A number of appellate court decisions have been made in this case. (See the related case in federal court Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. City of Burbank.)

City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority I (Nov. 12, 1998) -- The trial court sustained the Authority's demurrer without leave to amend and the appellate court reversed the judgment. (Ct. App. 2nd Dist.; unpublished opinion)

City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority II (May 5, 1999) -- The trial court found that because the City had delegated its powers under Public Utilities Code section 21661.6 to the Authority, the City was without power to enforce the statute as against the Authority. The appellate court reversed the judgment. (Ct. App. 2nd Dist.; 72 Cal.App.4th 366, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 28)

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. City of Burbank (May 5, 1999) -- The trial court granted a petition for writ of mandate, based solely upon a conclusion of law that was found erroneous in a companion case. The appellate court reversed the judgment and rejected respondent's contention that there are alternate grounds upon which it may be affirmed. (Ct. App. 2nd Dist.; unpublished opinion)

OTHER STATES

City of Bridgeton v. City of St. Louis, Mo. Ct. App., 2000 -- Under the Missouri version of the Uniform Aeronautics Act, St. Louis is authorized to condemn land outside its boundaries for airport development, but the Act also states that no city can establish an airport in violation of restrictions adopted by another city or county. In its long-running battle with St. Louis over expansion of St. Louis International Airport, Bridgeton enacted a zoning ordinance that effectively barred expansion of the airport. The court found that it was in the public interest to allow St. Louis to go forward with airport development, despite the local disagreement. (18 S.W.3d 107) (See related case, City of Bridgeton v. Slater, 8th Cir., April 7, 2000, 212 F.3d 448.)

Pennsylvania v. Rogers, Pa. Super. Ct. 1993 -- Rogers erected a 95-foot sign at his Dairy Queen Restaurant; the sign penetrated the airspace comprising the approach zone to a nearby airport. Rogers was found guilty of violating a state statute requiring prior approval of such signs and compliance with FAA regulations. He appealed, challenging the validity of the statute. The court noted that the statute enforces provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. The Act requires that a person who proposes to construct a structure in close proximity to an airport notify the FAA so that the FAA can determine whether the proposed structure constitutes a hazard to aviation. However, this determination is not legally enforceable -- the FAA cannot prohibit or limit proposed construction it deems dangerous to aviation. Instead, such regulation has been left to the states. The court rejected the claim that the statute effected a taking of property for which compensation was due. (634 A.2d 245, 430 Pa.Super. 253)

Riggs v. Burson, Tenn. 1997 — A state statute prohibiting use of land for a heliport within nine miles of a national park is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Act. (941 S.W.2d 44)

Sharp v. Howard County Board of Appeals, Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993 -- A number of property owners operated a grass airstrip on a portion of their residential properties in a rural area. The county zoning board granted a special zoning exception to the owners of the airstrip, finding that the noise impacts of the airstrip were inherent in the operation of an airstrip anywhere in the area designated "rural district" and were not atypical because of the airstrip's specific location. Owners of nearby properties sued to have the special exception overturned as arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the zoning board did not abuse its discretion in granting the exception after finding that the airstrip would have some adverse impacts on nearby residents. The court deferred to the board's conclusion that the adverse impacts were not "atypical." (632 A.2d 248)