The plaintiffs' complaint in this case, however, requests the state judiciary to use its injunctive power to prescribe regulations and rules relative to airport operations. Such rules mandated by a court through its injunctive powers would in no sense emanate from the airport proprietor, the City of Scottsdale. The Burbank preemption holding applies not only to state and local legislation in this area, but also to judicially made rules and regulations governing airport and airline operations. Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975).

Plaintiffs contend that Air Transport Association of America v. Crotti, 389 F.Supp. 58 (N.D.Cal.1975) (statutory three-judge panel), supports their position. There, a three-judge federal panel concluded that certain elements of California's airport noise regulation scheme were not invalid per se. California had enacted a statutory scheme whereby any airport which did not meet certain noise level standards ("CNEL standards") was subject to fines and penalties unless it secured a variance. The statutes authorized the state to monitor noise levels in the areas surrounding airports to determine if such land was subjected to excessive noise levels. Unless the airport had obtained a variance, the statute subjected the airport to penalties and possible prohibitions if its operations subjected any incompatible (i.e., residential) land use in the area to excessive noise.

While the Crotti court refused to hold that this "CNEL" scheme was preempted, its holding in that regard was very tentative. The court noted that no action had yet been taken by the state to force compliance with the statutory noise levels and that the regulation was basically directed at controlling land use compatibility. Thus, the court did not have before it any specific state-imposed regulation or requirement designed to force compliance with the "CNEL" noise standards, and it was not in a position to determine whether any specific mode of implementing the statute had been preempted. In that regard we note that when the state of California, acting through one of its regulatory agencies, subsequently attempted to implement the same "CNEL" regulations and actively enforce them against an airport proprietor, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the attempt, holding that the regulations violated Burbank's preemption holding. San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981).

In arriving at this conclusion the Ninth Circuit also rejected any implication which might otherwise be gained from Crotti from the premise that since a municipality is a creation of the state, and has discretion to voluntarily regulate an airport, which it owns, the state as the creator of the municipality might use its police powers to coerce the municipality to exercise its discretion in a specific manner for noise abatement purposes. Similarly, we reject plaintiffs' suggestion that since the defendant City of Scottsdale is the proprietor of the airport and admittedly has the discretion to voluntarily take actions affecting the operation of the airport which would lessen the impact of noise upon plaintiffs' lands, such action may be mandated by the state through injunctive relief by Arizona courts applying Arizona common law principles.

In summary, we do not find persuasive any argument, based upon Crotti, that the state court's injunctive power is exempt from preemption based upon the "proprietary" exception. The Burbank preemption holding applies not only to state and local legislative bodies, but also to attempts to have the courts fashion rules and regulations which would be invalid under Burbank. Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, supra.

Plaintiffs' final argument in support of their contention that the trial court erred in denying injunctive relief is principally directed to the trial court's refusal to enjoin the proposed extension of the airport's runway. Plaintiffs correctly point out that some courts have recognized that the Burbank preemption holding does not necessarily negate the authority of state and local governmental units to control the effects of aircraft noise through the exercise of land use planning and zoning powers, thereby insuring land use compatibility. See San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, supra; Wright v. County of Winnebago, 73 Ill.App.3d 337, 29 Ill.Dec. 347, 391 N.E.2d 772 (1979); Air Transport Association of America v. Crotti, supra. Relying upon this exception, plaintiffs characterize their claims as simply involving airport "site selection" and urge that the court can resolve the controversy through the application of state law governing zoning and land use planning.

Initially, we find plaintiffs' characterization of the thrust of their complaint misleading. It is uncontradicted that the Scottsdale Municipal Airport and the runway in question have been in existence at the same site long prior to the filing of plaintiffs' complaint in this action. There is no allegation that the site or location of the airport is to be moved or changed in any way by the proposed runway extension. With the possible exception of plaintiffs' Count IV which will be subsequently discussed in this opinion, plaintiffs' complaint does not involve a request for relief based upon a state or local planning and zoning law; rather, it is simply a request that the court prohibit the extension of an existing runway at an existing airport so as to relieve plaintiffs from a contemplated increase in noise levels and other disturbances emanating from aircraft utilizing the airport facilities. Likewise, there has been no allegation or showing that by the initial location of its airport, the City of Scottsdale has ab initio violated any zoning or land use planning laws of the state or any local legislative body.

Plaintiffs' contentions concerning the proposed runway extension are substantially analogous to those presented to the Illinois court in Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago, 16 Ill.App.3d 733, 306 N.E.2d 562 (1973). In that case, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the extension of a runway and expansion of facilities at O'Hare Airport. In holding that injunctive relief was not available, the court appropriately concluded that the relief sought impinged upon the Burbank preemption holding, stating:

[D]espite language relating to the expansion of runways and supporting facilities, the real thrust of the plaintiffs' complaint is to prohibit ... aircraft from producing noise or emitting fumes (while in flight over their territorial boundaries) in excess of certain limits to be fixed by the Illinois Chancery Court.

Similarly, the real thrust of plaintiffs' complaint in this action is a request that the court take action to limit noise levels emanating from aircraft flying over their lands, and plaintiffs' attempt to mask this request in "site selection" language must be rejected.

As a final observation concerning plaintiffs' contention that the trial court could have enjoined the runway extension under the state's land use planning and zoning powers, plaintiffs have cited no authority which would grant this power to the courts as opposed to state and local legislative bodies. In fact, while the state legislature has enacted legislation enabling the state's political subdivisions to adopt airport zoning ordinances assuring the development of compatible land uses in areas adjacent to airports, that legislation specifically prohibits political subdivisions from adopting any regulation which would restrict or limit the length of an airstrip or runway. [FN6] Thus, even if we were to disregard the preemption issue, we find a strong statement of legislative policy against the granting of the runway extension relief requested by plaintiffs.

[FN 6] A.R.S. s. 2-333, in pertinent part, provides:

"This article does not authorize the governing body of a city, town or county to restrict or limit the length or width of an airstrip or runway used for the landing and takeoff of aircraft. Any such restriction or limitation is void."

Substantially identical language is found in A.R.S. ss 2-301 B and 2-309 B.

We hold that plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief were properly dismissed by the trial court. In arriving at this conclusion we realize that there is some inconsistency in the notion that the adoption of regulatory legislation or the granting of injunctive relief in this area is precluded by the Burbank preemption doctrine, but that preemption does not preclude that element of control and regulation which is inherent in the granting of inverse eminent domain damages or damages for personal injury resulting from the complained-of operation. Regulation by the awarding of money damages can obviously be as much a regulation of conduct as is regulation by an injunction or legislative enactment. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Perhaps the justification for this inconsistency can be found in a balancing of the need for nationwide uniformity in affirmative regulation of aviation operations against the apparent necessity of providing a means by which those whose personal and property interests have been damaged may obtain appropriate redress.

We now proceed to consider the issues raised on appeal by plaintiffs concerning the dismissal of Count IV of their complaint.

Plaintiffs' Count IV was entitled "Violation of Master Plan Amendment Provisions" and was based upon the premise that the City of Scottsdale could not extend the existing runway at Scottsdale Municipal Airport without amending its "master plan" previously adopted pursuant to the provisions of A.R.S. s. 9-461.05, et seq. The defendants contend that no amendment of the master plan was required in order to implement their decision to extend the runway, and that therefore there was no necessity to comply with the provisions of A.R.S. s. 9-461.06 governing master plan amendments. [FN 7] The trial court agreed that no amendment of the master plan was necessary, and since there was no contention that the defendant city council had not otherwise validly exercised its proprietary and governmental powers from a procedural standpoint, dismissed plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief. We affirm.

[FN 7] During oral argument this court was advised by defendants' counsel that appropriate steps have now been taken to amend the master plan so as to arguably moot any question raised by plaintiffs in Count IV. Since such action was not made a part of the record before the trial court or by proper motion filed in this court, we have not considered these assertions by counsel in disposing of the issues raised concerning Count IV.

While the governing statutes enabling the adoption and amendment of general plans by municipalities provide no specific standards detailing the circumstances under which a general plan must be amended, we believe that some guidance can be obtained from a review of the authorizing statutes. A.R.S. s. 9-461(1) defines the term "general plan" as meaning "a municipal statement of land development policies, which may include maps, charts, graphs and text which set forth objectives, principles and standards for local growth and redevelopment enacted under the provisions of this article or any prior statute." A.R.S. s. 9-461.01 provides for the enactment of a general plan and requires the development of "such specific plans as may be necessary to implement the general plan." A.R.S. s. 9-461.05 A and C speak in terms of the adoption of "a comprehensive, long-range general plan for the development of the municipality ... (which) shall consist of a statement of community goals and development policies." For cities of over 50,000 population, there shall be included within the general plan "(a) transportation element showing a comprehensive transportation system" which may also include "aviation and related facilities." See A.R.S. s. 9-461.05 D(3)(a). After the adoption of a general plan, the planning agency is required to investigate and make recommendations to the legislative body "in order that it will serve as a pattern and guide for the orderly growth and development of the municipality...." A.R.S. s. 9-461.07 A(1).

While the general plan concept is a part of the overall legislation enabling the implementation of land use planning by municipalities, it is not to be confused with the exercise by a municipality of its zoning powers, although all of the municipality's zoning ordinances or regulations must be consistent with the municipality's general plan. See A.R.S. s. 9-462.01 E. We find no indication in the statutory scheme relating to the adoption of general plans that specificity to the extent urged by plaintiffs was intended so as to require the invocation of the burdensome statutory mechanism for general plan amendments when construction or expansion within a previously set forth category of use is contemplated. Obviously, here the contemplated use would remain the same, and while any increase in air traffic will just as obviously affect the use and enjoyment by the plaintiffs of their property, such an increase in use should not have been entirely unexpected from a planning standpoint in view of the entire area's expanding development. In conclusion, we agree with defendants that a general plan is just that, a "general" plan. The statutes do not indicate any intent that the general plan go into such minute detail as to specify the precise length of an airport runway. As Professor Schroeder has concisely stated:

The general plan is primarily a statement of community policies and objectives. Although maps and diagrams may be part of the plan, the plan does not necessarily freeze land uses or establish fixed land use patterns, as a zoning map might do. Consequently, a city may use its general plan to outline goals which the municipality seeks to implement through more specific plans and regulations.

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' Count IV.

We now proceed to a consideration of the final issue raised by plaintiffs on appeal. This issue concerns the dismissal of that portion of Count III of plaintiffs' complaint which sought relief based upon allegations of defendants' responsibility for violation of state and federal law governing flight operations by flight operators.

Specifically, Count III alleged violations of A.R.S. s 28-1741 et seq. and federal regulations pertaining to flight operations, 14 C.F.R., Part 91. The complaint sought only injunctive relief based upon these violations. Additionally, at oral argument counsel for appellants conceded that the issues on appeal related to prospective damage only, not damages already incurred. Therefore we do not consider whether this count states a claim for which damages can be awarded based upon any negligence theory. Under the preemption analysis applied to the relief sought in Counts I (trespass) and II (nuisance), to the extent that this same relief is sought in Count III, it is unavailable. The court cannot formulate injunctive relief based on state statutes regulating flight operations because the federal statutory scheme precludes additional regulation of flight.

The only question remaining for resolution is whether the court can enjoin future violations of federal flight regulations. Can these plaintiffs seek state court injunctive enforcement of the federal regulations here involved? We hold that such relief is unavailable to them.

The Federal Aviation Act clearly delineates those parties who may seek judicial enforcement of aviation regulations:

s. 1487. Judicial enforcement; jurisdiction; application; costs

(a) If any person violates any provision of this chapter, or any rule, regulation, requirement, or order thereunder, or any term, condition, or limitation of any certificate or permit issued under this chapter, the Board or Administrator, as the case may be, their duly authorized agents, or, in the case of a violation of section 1514 of this title, the Attorney General, or, in the case of a violation of section 1371(a) of this title, any party in interest, may apply to the district court of the United States, for any district wherein such person carries on his business or wherein the violation occurred, for the enforcement of such provision of this chapter, or of such rule, regulation, requirement, order, term, condition, or limitation; and such court shall have jurisdiction to enforce obedience thereto by a writ of injunction or other process, mandatory or otherwise, restraining such person, his officers, agents, employees, and representatives, from further violation of such provision of this chapter or of such rule, regulation, requirement, order, term, condition, or limitation, and requiring their obedience thereto.

Under this statute violations of all regulations may be enjoined by the board or administrator.[FN 8] On the other hand, a "party in interest" may apply for an injunction only in those cases involving violations of 49 U.S.C. 1371 (1976 and Supp. 1981) relating to certificates of public convenience and necessity. We construe this statute to preclude direct injunctive enforcement of any other FAA regulation by a private "party in interest". The federal regulations which plaintiffs alleged to have been violated do not emanate from 49 U.S.C. 1371(a). Therefore injunctive relief is not available to them. A private party is not completely without a remedy for regulation violations; that remedy, however, is administrative. A complaint may be filed with the Federal Department of Transportation, which must investigate the charges and can issue orders compelling compliance. 49 U.S.C. s 1482 (1976 and Supp.1981).

[FN 8] This authority has been transferred to the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administrator. 49 U.S.C. 1655(a), (c) and (d) (1976).

The judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings concerning plaintiffs' claims relating to water diversion and their claims for money damages.

JACOBSON and WREN, JJ., concur.