The issue of whether a jurisdictional grant to review one agency's actions reaches another agency's actions was addressed in California Save Our Streams Council, 887 F.2d 908. In that case, the Ninth Circuit considered the reach of jurisdiction of the appellate courts under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 792 et seq. (1992). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed to issue a license for a power facility on land managed by the Forest Service. As required by its governing regulations, FERC solicited conditions to be imposed on the use of the land from the Forest Service. The Forest Service imposed fourteen conditions on the proposed license, and FERC issued the license. The Council brought suit against the Forest Service, alleging a failure to follow procedures outlined in statutes separate from the Federal Power Act.

The Ninth Circuit determined that under the Federal Power Act, exclusive jurisdiction to review rested with the courts of appeals. In making this determination, the court stated "the practical effect of the action in district court is an assault on an important ingredient of the FERC license." Id. at 912. The court also noted the possibility for duplicative suits if the action against the Forest Service was allowed to proceed in district court. "The point of creating a special review procedure in the first place is to avoid duplication and inconsistency.... Appellants' theory would resurrect the very problems that Congress sought to eliminate." Id.

The same issues arise here. The challenge to the BLM centers on the effect of the airport on the surrounding area. Without the construction of the airport, the BLM's actions would be meaningless. Moreover, if the BLM actions could not be directly reviewed by us while the FAA actions could, the bifurcated suit could result in inconsistency, duplication, and delay. Finally, we note "[i]f there is any ambiguity as to whether jurisdiction lies with a district court or with a court of appeals we must resolve that ambiguity in favor of review by a court of appeals." Suburban O'Hare Comm'n, 787 F.2d at 192. Given the statutory scheme in which the actions of the BLM arose and the analysis discussed above, we conclude that we do have jurisdiction to review the actions of the BLM.

Petitioners suggest a finding of jurisdiction would lessen the importance attached to the BLM and the policies of FLPMA by treating them as subsidiary to the FAA. Such a characterization is unsound. In determining that the actions of the BLM were made at the request of and as part of the FAA's planning process, we do not disregard the mission of the BLM and the important policies of FLPMA, which we hold in the highest regard.

As described above, the airport site is located on public land administered by the BLM pursuant to section 202 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. s 1712. The site was managed under the 1973 Management Framework Plan, which, respondents agree, did not authorize disposal of the site. Resp.Br. at 20. The proposed 1989 RMP also contained a ban on transfer of federal ownership of the land: "Scenic Highway Corridor ACEC would be ... retained in public ownership and not classified, segregated or withdrawn from entry." Rec. (No. 91-9513), supp. vol. I, at 67-68. Further, the RMP specifically "exclud[ed] surface disturbance to protect ... Scenic Highway Corridor ACEC." Id. at 12. Thus, under either the existing or the proposed RMP, a plan amendment had to be effected before the land could be transferred from the BLM.

Petitioners contend the BLM's actions violated the notice requirements of FLPMA, which mandate public participation from the beginning of the planning process. [FN13] The statute clearly states that "[t]he Secretary shall with public involvement and consistent with the terms and conditions of this Act, develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands." 43 U.S.C. s 1712(a) (emphasis added). The FAA claims sufficient notice of the plan amendment was given in the scoping notice, which listed "U-95 Scenic Corridor Restrictions" as a scoping issue. Rec. (No. 90-9564), supp. vol. III, doc. 15 at F5 (hereinafter FEIS).

FN13. Petitioners raise other issues concerning the BLM's actions. In light of our decision, however, we need not address those arguments.

Public notice and opportunity for participation in resource management plan preparation shall be appropriate to the areas and people involved and shall be provided at the following specific points in the planning process:

(1) General notice at the outset of the process inviting participation in the identification of issues. (See ss 1610.2(c) and 1610.4-1);

(2) Review of the proposed planning criteria (See s 1610.4-2);

(3) Publication of the draft resource management plan and draft environmental impact statement (See s 1610.4-7);

(4) Publication of the proposed resource management plan and final environmental impact statement which triggers the opportunity for protest (See ss 1610.4-8 and 1610.5-1(b)); and

(5) Public notice and comment on any significant change made to the plan as a result of action on a protest (See s 1610.5-1(b)).

The regulations specifically describe the public participation required from the very beginning of the process.

At the outset of the planning process, the public, other Federal agencies, State and local governments and Indian tribes shall be given an opportunity to suggest concerns, needs, and resource use, development, and protection opportunities for consideration in the preparation of the resource management plan.

A brief chronology of the actions of both agencies is helpful in determining whether the BLM met the notice requirements. In September 1987, the BLM issued a proposed RMP for the disputed area. [FN14] Rec. (No. 91-9513), supp. vol. I, at i. This RMP contained a ban on the transfer of the land: the "Scenic Highway Corridor ACEC would be ... retained in public ownership." Rec. (No. 91-9513), supp. vol. I, at 67-68. On December 17, 1987, the FAA issued its scoping packet with the "U-95 Scenic Corridor Restrictions" as an issue. FEIS at F1-F4. No mention was made of any specific "restrictions" contemplated. The scoping packet referred to three possible sites for the airport, id. at F5, none of which was in the U-95 Scenic Corridor. Following the scoping packet, the FAA engaged in a site selection study during 1988 and 1989. From that study, the current airport site was chosen. The record does not establish that the study was made public.

[FN 14] Due to the large number of comments on this RMP, it was later treated as a draft.

The FAA's argument that the scoping notice provided sufficient notice of the plan amendment is completely unpersuasive. At the time of the issuance of the scoping packet in 1987, neither BLM site subsequently specified in the DEIS and the FEIS had yet been identified. See FEIS at F1-F4. Consequently, the FAA's argument that a mention in 1987 of "U-95 scenic corridor restrictions" with no further specifics is equivalent to notice of the necessity for a plan amendment is specious.

The FAA argues that petitioners received actual notice of the intended plan amendment through the scoping notice and the DEIS. We have already demonstrated that the scoping notice did not provide the requisite notice. Moreover, even assuming that the DEIS provided sufficient notice and recognizing that petitioners did have the opportunity to comment on the DEIS, the BLM still violated its own regulations. Notice is required to be provided at the "onset of the planning process." 43 CFR s 1610.4-1. It is clear that discussion of a transfer of land had begun months prior to the issuance of DEIS and the DEIS was thus not the beginning of the planning process.

Congress, through FLPMA and NEPA, has determined that the public has a right to participate in actions affecting public lands. As the record in this case clearly reflects, actions such as this one, involving more than one federal agency and various federal environmental laws, contain serious potential for confusion, especially for the public. Under the specific requirements of NEPA and FLPMA, the BLM was required to provide petitioners and the public with clear notice of its actions so that the statutory participation could take place. It is apparent from the chronology set forth above that the notice given was far from adequate. We therefore hold that the notice requirements to amend the plan and transfer the land were not met.

Petitioners also assert that the actions of the FAA violate section 4(f) of the Transportation Act and section 2208 of the AAIA. At the crux of their argument is the FAA's determinations that the airport would have "no significant impact" and "no significant adverse effect" on the visitors or recreational use of the Glen Canyon area. Petitioners contend the FAA applied an unlawful standard in making these determinations. [FN15] The FAA argues in response that the agency adequately utilized a lawful standard.

[FN 15] Given our decision on this issue, we need not address petitioners' other contentions.

"The determining factors as to whether the impacts are significant are the threshold levels defined in FAA Order 5050.4a." FEIS at 4.1. This FAA document "provides instructions and guidance for preparing and processing ... environmental impact statements [ ] for airport development proposals." Airport Environmental Handbook, FAA Order 5050.4a at 1 (Oct. 8, 1985), Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. In turn, Order 5050.4a references the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 CFR Pt. 150, App. A. Appendix A is a Land Use Compatibility chart which lists land uses and the noise levels considered compatible with each use as measured under the Ldn methodology. The FEIS contains a copy of this chart in its appendix. FEIS at App. 4.

We review the FAA's determination of no significant impact and the decision to fund the airport under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2862, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414, 91 S.Ct. 814, 822, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). While our inquiry must be "searching and careful," we must uphold the agency if there is a rational basis for its opinion. Thomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 643 (10th Cir.1990). "All the agency need do is demonstrate it considered relevant factors and alternatives after a full ventilation of the issues, and that the choice it made was reasonable based on those considerations." Id. We review the factual findings underlying the no significant impact determination under the substantial evidence standard. See 49 U.S.C.App. s 1486(e).

As mentioned above, the FEIS stated that the threshold levels to determine significance were those listed under the Land Use Compatibility chart which made use of the Ldn methodology. However, in evaluating the impacts of overflights on visitors to Glen Canyon, "the agency did not use the Ldn methodology typically employed to analyze potential impacts near the proposed airport sites because that methodology 'is uniquely suited to assess ... noise impact in the immediate airport environs'.[sic]" Resp.Br. at 8 (quoting FEIS at 9.29). Instead, the FAA attempted to assess the pre-airport noise environment and project the post-airport noise environment based on an audibility standard. The FEIS does not list any new threshold levels based on audibility. Thus, it is unclear what the FAA considered the threshold for significance.

It is clear, however, that the FAA believed the airport would double the current level of aircraft audibility. To determine the actual impact of the airport on the noise environment, the FAA estimated the number of aircraft operations for the years 1997 and 2007 if the airport were built and if the airport were not built. FEIS at 4.36-4.37. Under the FAA's own estimates, by the year 2007, the number of aircraft would at least double with the construction of the airport. [FN16]

[FN 16] The National Park Service undertook a noise monitoring program at Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. The study focused on "detectable" noise and used "audibility ... as the primary noise descripter." Rec. (No. 90-9564), supp. vol. I, doc. 8. The report based the pre-airport noise atmosphere on measurements taken from a neighboring national park. The NPS determined that the proposed airport site would double the noise impacts from the pre-airport noise atmosphere. The FAA dismissed the report as "highly theoretical" and not "relate[d] to actual conditions at the proposed airport site." FEIS at 9.28.

Thus, the FAA determined that both the number of aircraft and the level of audibility would double. In determining the significance of this increase, the FAA stated that such a determination is "subjective as the degree of impact is dependent upon the recipient's attitude and sensitivity, as well as objective measures of sound ..." FEIS at 4.34. While the FAA recognized that "[n]ot much research has been conducted on noise impacts to recreational users," id. at 4.42, the FEIS assumed that "audible aircraft would likely detract from the visitor's experience," id. at 4.41. The FEIS discusses a survey conducted for the Jackson Hole, Wyoming airport in which none of the participants mentioned aircraft noise annoyance as an irritating or bothersome condition. Id. However, no comparison is made of the Jackson Hole airport and the proposed Halls Crossing airport. The FEIS itself describes the limited value of the Jackson Hole study: "[o]ther surveys would likely reveal different values and attitudes." Id.

Despite the absence of any evidence describing the impact of aircraft noise on visitors' recreational experiences and the FAA's recognition that this determination is subjective, the FAA determined the airport would have no significant impact on the recreational use of the area. Id. The FAA provided no empirical evidence to support this claim, which appears to contradict other findings in the FEIS. The FAA has substituted its subjective evaluation for that of recreational users instead of attempting to ascertain the actual impact on the users themselves. Given these circumstances, we cannot say that agency action was "rational" or "reasonable" in determining that the airport would have no significant impact from a noise standpoint on the surrounding recreational environment. See Thomas Brooks Chartered, 920 F.2d at 643 (applying rational basis test). The FAA argues that the finding of "no significant impact" is a technical issue which is committed to the agency's judgment. The FAA further contends that there is no acceptable methodology to measure noise impacts on visitors' recreational experience, so the analysis undertaken was necessarily subjective and inexact. Resp.Br. at 13, 14 and 27. While we agree that we owe deference to agency determinations in an area where the agency has expertise, City of Aurora, 749 F.2d at 1462, we need not defer to irrational judgments. The FAA explicitly rejected the Ldn methodology and performed the noise impact analysis based on various assumptions and subjective values which did not provide us with a "rational" decision that we could assess.

The cases cited by the FAA do not require that we hold otherwise. See Communities, Inc. v. Busey, 956 F.2d 619, 624 (6th Cir.1992) (deferring to FAA's use of Ldn methodology to measure noise impact); Citizens Against Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 201 (D.C.Cir.1991) (deferring to FAA's use of Ldn and single event methodology to measure noise impacts where "FAA proceeded to mold a body of data, dissect it, and display it in comprehensible forms."); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 129 (D.C.Cir.1985) (deferring to agency's use of Ldn methodology and stating that "[t]he court's responsibility lies in assuring that the agency had before it all the data to make an informed decision that adequately took account of the important environmental concerns.").

For the reasons set out above, we must conclude that the action of the FAA approving the airport project based on a finding of "no significant impact" and "no significant adverse affect" is arbitrary and capricious.

"When an agency relies on a number of findings, one or more of which are erroneous, we must reverse and remand only when there is a significant chance that but for the errors the agency might have reached a different result." Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. United States, 762 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1985). It is unclear here whether the BLM would have reached the same decision if active involvement by the public was present from the beginning of the process. We therefore REVERSE the BLM's plan amendment and the transfer of land. We REMAND for further proceedings to determine whether the land should be retained under BLM control and management or reconveyed to San Juan County under a newly proposed land use plan amendment. In the case of the FAA, the airport has already been built. This does not mean that a remand would be meaningless, however. On remand, the FAA should re-analyze the impact of the airport under section 4(f) and section 2208. The FAA may determine that it must make use of studies not utilized in the current FEIS. [FN17] If a "significant" impact is found, section 4(f) and section 2208 require that all reasonable steps be taken to mitigate the damage or adverse impact. We therefore REVERSE the FAA's determination of no significant impact and REMAND to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

[FN 17] We note that the FAA now has the benefit of being able to perform actual noise monitoring as the airport is in operation.