With respect to plaintiff's property value argument, the Navy again claims it was not required to discuss the impact of the aircraft transfer on property values because, as with the mitigation costs, determining the impact is too speculative. See Town of Norfolk v. EPA, 761 F.Supp. 867, 887 (D.Mass.1991) (holding that the failure to place a dollar value on possible decrease in property value was not unreasonable); Olmsted Citizens for a Better Community v. United States, 606 F.Supp. 964, 974 (D.Minn.1985) (stating that there is no requirement to discuss nonphysical impact such as property values). In this case, not only did the Navy explain the uncertainty surrounding attempts to measure the effect on property values, [FN 16] but plaintiff's own evidence also supports the Navy's argument on this issue.

[FN 16] In response to comments on the DEIS, the Navy stated: Property values are determined by a combination of neighborhood characteristics (e.g., the quality of local schools, local property taxes, access to transportation, and the crime rate) and individual housing characteristics (e.g., age of the house, number of rooms, and amenities such as garages). There are no definitive federal standards for quantifying the impact of aircraft noise on property values. Therefore, we cannot quantify whether the increase in noise will affect property values. FEIS at A-5-118.

[FN 17] The difficulty raised by trying to estimate an effect on property values is further compounded by the context of this case. When NAS Oceana was first established decades ago, it was relatively isolated. Only in the last twenty years or so, as plaintiff points out, has there been substantial encroachment on the areas surrounding NAS Oceana. Here, where the airfield existed before a large majority of the affected homes, it would seem that any diminution in value was built into the cost of the home to begin with. Thus, to the extent that the arrival of the F/A-18s will only cause the noise contours to expand slightly beyond the 1978 contours, it is not clear that the arrival of the F/A-18s will have any effect on property values. If anything, given the fact that the retirement of the A-6 led to a drawdown in personnel at NAS Oceana, it is just as likely that home values will actually increase, not decrease, as the influx of Navy personnel from NAS Cecil Field fuels competition for single family homes in the areas surrounding NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress.

4. Safety Risks

Plaintiff next asserts that the FEIS inadequately examined the safety risks of the aircraft transfer. Plaintiff claims that, rather than use Accident Potential Zones ("APZs") to measure the safety risk of aircraft crashes, the Navy should have used other criteria such as accidents per operational hour to calculate the probability of an accident occurring in a populated area and the probability of any resulting casualties or damages. Plaintiff also claims the safety analysis in the FEIS fails to make a comparative analysis of the risks associated with each realignment scenario. Plaintiff's arguments, however, fail both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.

First, the court reiterates that questions of methodology are within an agency's discretion. See, e.g., Valley Citizens, 886 F.2d at 469. So long as the method chosen reasonably informs the decisionmaker and the public of potential environmental impacts and allows appropriate comparison between alternatives, the FEIS is adequately prepared. Id. at 460. In this case, the Navy chose to use APZs as the vehicle by which it measured the safety risks around the air stations in each realignment scenario. Rather than use generic aircraft accident rate statistics as argued for by plaintiff, the Navy chose to concentrate its resources on developing a safety analysis for those areas closest to each air station. As the ROD and FEIS both indicate, individuals living within an APZ have a greater risk of being affected by an aircraft accident than those outside APZs. ROD at 9-10; FEIS at 3.1-79. See FEIS at Appendix G (detailing methodology used to create APZs) The analysis contained in the FEIS, however, does not stop at such a conclusory allegation. As with the noise contours discussed above, the FEIS also compared the projected APZ contours after the F/A-18s' arrival with the pre-arrival APZ, and concluded that there would be a significant increase in land area and population within the revised APZ. FEIS at 4.4-3 to 4.4-7; id. at Figures 4.4-3 to 4.4-6. Thus, there is no colorable claim that the FEIS failed to adequately inform the decisionmaker of the large population that would be subjected to an increased risk of an aircraft crash as a result of the F/A-18 transfer.

Second, it is not clear to the court that the methodology proposed by plaintiff would result in a more detailed analysis. In fact, it seems likely that plaintiff's proposal would yield a less detailed, therefore less useful, analysis. Plaintiff faults the Navy for not basing its safety analysis on the number of accidents per operational hour. However, no matter what that figure, if the accident per operational hour rate was applied to all of the areas surrounding the air stations, including those outside APZs, the result would be a uniform, and statistically insignificant, crash probability. In other words, use of such a generic measure applied to a greater area does not account for the fact that a majority of aircraft accidents near airfields occur in the airfield landing and takeoff patterns. This greater risk was not only well-documented in the FEIS, see FEIS at Appendix G, but was also specifically acknowledged by plaintiff. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for A Preliminary Injunction And in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 37-38 (discussing placement of shopping mall at dangerous point in NAS Oceana traffic pattern and fact that forty-one percent land use in APZs around NAS Oceana is residential housing).

Plaintiff expends a great deal of effort explaining how the Navy has vigorously opposed encroachment on the NAS Oceana APZs over the last twenty years, especially in 1976 with regards to the construction of a local shopping mall. As plaintiff's brief points out, the mall was located in the landing pattern for NAS Oceana, precisely at a "place where [crashes are] more likely to happen," because "that's where a lot of accidents occur around airfields." Id. at 38 (quoting the statement of a former NAS Oceana commanding officer in a local newspaper). Far from pointing out any error in the Navy's methodology, this portion of plaintiff's argument directly supports the importance of the methodology used by the Navy and the significant distinction between areas inside and outside an APZ.

Finally, plaintiff attempts to argue that a supplemental FEIS should be prepared based on the fact that four months after the FEIS was completed, the Chief of Naval Operations reported to Congress that there was an eighty-two percent increase in the aviation mishap rate for the previous year. Plaintiff, however, fails to demonstrate the relevance of this single statistic, taken out of context, to the inquiry before the court. There is no indication whether any portion of the increase was attributable to F/A-18 operations, or where the increase in crashes occurred, i.e., near airfields, over land but not near airfields, or at sea from aircraft carriers. As a result, there is no indication that this "new" information would have any bearing on the safety analysis used by the Navy, which used aircraft crash data over a thirty year period. One anomalous year, which "followed a long-term downward trend in aviation mishaps, reaching a new low [the year before the increase]," Plaintiff's Exhibit 89, at 4 (statement of Admiral Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 29, 1998), simply has no significant impact on the environmental study conducted by the Navy.

Plaintiff's other arguments on this issue are either contrary to the record or have no merit. [FN 18] Accordingly, the court finds that the FEIS adequately addressed the safety risks of the F/A-18 transfer.

[FN 18] For instance, plaintiff argues that the FEIS failed to reveal the consequences of an aircraft crash near NAS Oceana to the decisionmaker and the public because the FEIS does not discuss the availability of medical care, hospitals, and emergency or disaster assistance to respond to a crash. However, as the Navy points out, the FEIS contains a detailed discussion of fire and emergency services available both on base, and in the Cities of Virginia Beach and Chesapeake, FEIS at 3.1-107 to 3.1-110, as well as available medical facilities. FEIS at 3.1-112 to 3.1-113.

5. Air Quality Impacts

Although plaintiff has raised a number of arguments about the air quality discussion contained in the FEIS, most of those arguments are not relevant to the question before the court. [FN 19] Instead, most of plaintiff's arguments, to the extent that they have validity at all, [FN 20] do not indicate a failure to comply with NEPA at all, but, instead, involve compliance with the Clean Air Act, which is not at issue in the current action. NEPA does not impose a requirement on government agencies to comply with the provisions of the Clean Air Act. See Conservation Law Foundation v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250, 1262 (1st Cir.1996) (stating that there is "no connection between NEPA and Clean Air Act compliance"). Under NEPA, an agency is only required to describe and analyze the adverse effects on the human environment. In the air quality context, as long as the FEIS reasonably describes the change in pollutants that will result from a proposed action, and does so without any significant errors, the FEIS is adequate. Valley Citizens, 886 F.2d at 467 (holding that omission of over fifty tons of nitrous oxides from air quality analysis was not significant enough to require the Air Force to redo environmental impact study). Essentially, the air pollution described in a FEIS can be well in excess of Clean Air Act limits, but so long as the pollutant amounts were calculated without a significant error, NEPA is satisfied, even though the provisions of the Clean Air Act may not be.

[FN 19] Plaintiff's inapplicable arguments are: the FEIS was inadequate because it failed to disclose the amount and impact of air emissions offsets from two Hampton Roads emission sources that were used in the State Implementation Plan and the resulting economic impact of NAS Oceana's use of that offset; the FEIS erred by analyzing the air quality impact on the Hampton Roads Air Quality Control Region, and not the area immediately surrounding NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress; and the FEIS does not discuss the consequences of more restrictive air quality standards recently approved by the EPA.

[FN 20] For example, regulations promulgated as a result of the Clean Air Act specifically permit the use of offsets to determine conformity with State Implementation Plans. 40 C.F.R. 93.158(a)(2). Thus, plaintiff's argument on this point is meritless. Likewise, plaintiff's argument with respect to the Navy's failure to conform to more restrictive air quality standards recently approved by the EPA is without merit, given the uncertainty surrounding the eventual implementation of those standards. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States EPA, 1999 WL 300618, at *27 (D.C.Cir. May 14, 1999) (holding that EPA was arbitrary and capricious in selection of portion of the new standards for coarse particulate matter and remanding case to the EPA "for further consideration of all standards at issue" in light of panel majority's holding that EPA's construction of Clean Air Act constituted unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).

A fair reading of the administrative record indicates that over the two-year period leading up to publication of the FEIS, the Navy made an extensive effort to ensure the correctness of its air emissions analysis. The fact that there were changes in assumptions and model input data is only to be expected where the pieces of information required to put the air quality study together had to be gathered from many different places in a far-reaching, large organization, such as the Navy.

Plaintiff has not conducted the type of analysis required to carry its burden of proof on this point. The burden on plaintiff is not just to point out possible errors in the agency's assumptions and methodology, but to demonstrate how and why the FEIS was erroneous. See Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 719 (1st Cir.1979) (requiring a defect in an environmental impact statement to be demonstrated before court will review sufficiency of defect). Only after such a demonstration can the reviewing court determine whether the alleged error in the FEIS was significant enough to find that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously. See Valley Citizens, 886 F.2d at 463. Plaintiff has simply not alleged any such defect in this case.

Finally, plaintiff argues that, even if the Navy's conformity analysis is accurate, the FEIS failed to discuss the health effects of an increase in emissions on the population surrounding NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress. Plaintiff, without citation to any supporting authority, claims that it is not enough that the Navy demonstrate compliance with the air quality standards established by the Clean Air Act, but must also separately analyze any potential health effects on the local population. However, given the purpose and structure of the Clean Air Act, such an analysis appears to be obviated, where, as in this case, a proposed action is in conformity with the maintenance plan for an attainment area.

The purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and enhance the Nation's air quality, to initiate and accelerate a national program of research and development designed to control air pollution, to provide technical and financial assistance to the States in the execution of pollution control programs, and to encourage the development of regional pollution control programs." Conservation Law Foundation v. Dept. of Air Force, 864 F.Supp. 265, 273 (D.N.H.1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. 7401(b)). To this end, the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to establish ambient air quality standards necessary to "protect the public health." 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1) (1994). As a result, the EPA promulgated National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"), which establish the maximum limits of pollutants allowed in the outside ambient air. The EPA designates air quality control regions around the country as either having attained the NAAQS ("attainment"), not attained the standards ("nonattainment"), or as unclassified because there is not enough information available to make an attainment determination. When an air quality control region reaches attainment status, it is then required to use the State Implementation Plan to maintain attainment.

On June 26, 1996, the Hampton Roads Air Quality Control Region was redesignated by the EPA from marginal nonattainment to attainment for ozone. [FN 21] By this certification, the EPA signified that the air quality standards in the Hampton Roads region were below that which posed any threat to public health. In June, 1997, the EPA approved the state of Virginia's maintenance plan for the Hampton Roads Air Quality Control Region, indicating that the EPA believed that the plan would allow the region to remain below the NAAQS, and, therefore, below the level at which pollutants would form any threat to public health. In the maintenance plan, the state of Virginia specifically provided an emissions allotment for NAS Oceana that included the possibility of moving the F/A-18 aircraft to NAS Oceana. Because the FEIS determined that the emission levels of ozone precursors were well within the allocation provided in the maintenance plan, the relocation of the F/A-18 aircraft would not return the Hampton Roads Air Quality Control Region above a level posing a threat to public health. As a result, there was simply no health risk for the Navy to discuss in the FEIS. Accordingly, the court finds that the Navy did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in failing to discuss the health effects of the additional pollutants given the fact that the air impact analysis indicated that the proposed action was in conformity with a state maintenance plan for an area in attainment status for all the relevant pollutants.

[FN 21] The Region was already in attainment for all other pertinent pollutants.

6. Mitigation Measures

Plaintiff also argues that the FEIS failed to adequately address potential means of mitigating the adverse environmental consequences of moving the aircraft to NAS Oceana. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the Navy failed to examine and discuss the feasibility of constructing an additional outlying airfield for NAS Oceana. According to plaintiff, a new outlying airfield would result in a substantial decrease in air operations, and their attendant noise, safety, and air quality impacts, around NAS Oceana. Plaintiff also faults the FEIS for failing to fully discuss possible noise mitigation that could be accomplished through a complete review of flight procedures at NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress.

Because NEPA requires agencies to examine the adverse environmental effects of proposed actions, there is an implicit requirement that the FEIS also discuss efforts to avoid those adverse effects. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S.Ct. 1835. NEPA specifically requires agencies to examine possible mitigation measures in the FEIS. 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(f); id. at § 1502.16(h). However, because NEPA does not require detailed explanations of possible mitigation efforts, there does not need to be a fully-developed mitigation plan presented in the FEIS. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 353, 109 S.Ct. 1835. In fact, because it is only procedural and not substantive in nature, NEPA does not require agencies to implement any of the mitigation measures discussed in the FEIS. Id.

In developing the alternative realignment scenarios, one of the screening criteria used by the Navy was the existence of outlying airfields within fifty nautical miles of the main base. NAS Oceana survived the screening process, in part, because it had just such a field, NALF Fentress, well within the fifty nautical mile limit. As such, plaintiff's argument that the Navy failed to discuss the mitigation that could occur through construction of an additional outlying airfield is misplaced. NAS Oceana already has an outlying airfield for conducting the noisy and repetitive field carrier landing practices required before deployment aboard aircraft carriers. Plaintiff would have the Navy discuss building a second outlying field near NAS Oceana, a requirement that is not imposed on any of the other air stations discussed in the FEIS. As a result, the court finds that the Navy was not arbitrary and capricious for failing to discuss the possibility of constructing a second outlying field as a mitigation measure for NAS Oceana.

The court also finds no error in the Navy's discussion of noise mitigation measures at NAS Oceana. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the FEIS clearly indicates that the Navy did, in fact, completely review flight operations and procedures at NAS Oceana. FEIS at 4.8-12. [FN 22] From this review, the Navy developed a number of very specific mitigation measures that it implemented at NAS Oceana, including the elimination of engine maintenance runs after 11:00 p.m., changes in takeoff procedures and late-night arrival procedures, and establishing a navigational aid at NALF Fentress to aid pilots in flying the FCLP pattern there. FEIS at 4.8-13. The FEIS also identified additional mitigation measures that would be undertaken in the event that the recommended ARS (ARS 1) was selected. FEIS at 4.8-14.

[FN 22] The FEIS states that the Navy conducted a complete review of aircraft arrival and departure procedures, airfield hours of operation, pattern altitudes, aircraft power settings, flight tracks, and aircraft maintenance runup times. FEIS at 4.8-12. Other than a blanket assertion that a "bottoms up" review of flight procedures is needed, plaintiff fails to identify any specific areas that the Navy should have examined, but failed to do so. It seems clear to the court that the Navy did, in fact, conduct exactly the type of thorough review of flight operations sought by plaintiff.

7. Environmental Justice

In accordance with Executive Order 12898, the Navy conducted an environmental justice analysis of the realignment scenarios and included this analysis in the FEIS. [FN 23] Plaintiff contends that this analysis was flawed because the Navy used different population figures in the environmental justice portion of the FEIS than it did in the FEIS section on noise impacts. However, NEPA does not require an environmental justice analysis, and, as the Navy correctly points out, Executive Order 12898 specifically states that any agency actions taken pursuant to the provisions of the Order are not subject to judicial review. Exec. Order 12,898, 59 Fed.Reg. 7,629 (1994) ("This order shall not be construed to create any right to judicial review involving the compliance or noncompliance of the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person with this order."); see Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 161 F.3d at 575. Because the court does not have jurisdiction to review this portion of the FEIS, the merits of plaintiff's argument are not addressed.

[FN 23] Executive Order 12898 states that Federal agencies whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain and analyze information on the race, national origin, income level, and other readily accessible and appropriate information for areas surrounding facilities or sites expected to have a substantial environmental, human health, or economic effect on the surrounding populations, when such facilities or sites become the subject of a substantial Federal environmental administrative or judicial action. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed.Reg. 7,629 (1994).

8. Cumulative Impacts

When designing the scope of the environmental impact study, an agency must include cumulative actions, which are those that "when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts." 40 C.F.R. 1508.25(a)(2) (emphasis added). Significant cumulative impacts occur if the current action, when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, results in significant adverse effects on the human environment. 40 C.F.R. 1502.22; id. at § 1508.7 (defining "cumulative impacts"). When evaluating cumulative impacts, the agency must clearly indicate any incomplete or unavailable information that prevents a complete evaluation of the environmental impacts. 40 C.F.R. 1502.22.

The FEIS at issue here contained a substantial discussion of cumulative impacts. The cumulative impact section specifically examined military and civilian airspace use around the three air stations, personnel relocations as a result of the realignment decision, and general growth trends in the regions around NAS Oceana, MCAS Beaufort, and MCAS Cherry Point. The FEIS also acknowledged that the realignment decision "could be cumulatively impacted" by the replacement of the F/A-18 C/D aircraft being relocated to NAS Oceana, along with the F-14 aircraft currently at NAS Oceana, because "it is reasonably foreseeable" that those aircraft would be replaced by a different series of F/A-18 aircraft, the F/A-18 E/F. FEIS at 9.1-7. However, the FEIS also indicated that if any such proposal was made, it would occur at some unknown time in the future, at which time another EIS would be developed in accordance with NEPA. Id. The Navy did not stop its discussion of the E/F at this point, though, but went on to detail some of the expected changes that could result from the E/F aircraft and discuss the reasons why a complete evaluation of the environmental impact was not possible in the current FEIS.

According to the FEIS, as a general matter the E/F aircraft will emit approximately fifty-five percent more nitrous oxides than C/D aircraft under the same operating conditions. FEIS at 9.1-14. Compared to the F-14s, the E/F aircraft will produce twenty-eight percent fewer nitrous oxide emissions. Id. However, the FEIS indicates that a complete analysis of the air quality impact of the E/F aircraft was not possible because the future mix of E/F and C/D aircraft at NAS Oceana is unknown. In addition, emission estimates can only be developed for relocation sites after operating mode and time in mode scenarios are developed for each location, which is not yet possible given that the future aircraft mix is unknown. FEIS at 9.1-13. With respect to the possible noise impact of the E/F aircraft, the FEIS did indicate that there would be changes in the noise contours around NAS Oceana and NALF Fentress. Again, however, the FEIS also indicated that the changes could not be precisely predicted because the future mix of aircraft sited at NAS Oceana is still unknown. Id. Based on a prototype E/F aircraft, the FEIS stated as a general matter that the E/F is quieter than the C/D version of the F/A-18 and noisier than the F-14. Id.

Plaintiff, however, argues that the cumulative impact discussion contained in the FEIS did not adequately address the future impact of the possible E/F replacement action. Plaintiff faults the Navy for not indicating in the FEIS when the E/F replacement is to occur, because plaintiff claims that the administrative record reveals that the E/F aircraft are scheduled to replace the F-14 aircraft beginning in 1999. Plaintiff's Exhibit 106.

However, as the government points out, plaintiff has not demonstrated that a formal proposal has been made to purchase and site the E/F aircraft at NAS Oceana. Plaintiff's reliance on programming and budgetary materials is not relevant, as those documents are only projections and, as plaintiff's own evidence demonstrates, are subject to the political process. [FN 24] NEPA does not require agencies to examine ethereal possibilities, but only future actions that have actually been proposed. North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125, 1131 (4th Cir.1992). Plaintiff does not contest the government's assertion that the only F/A-18 E/F procurement decision that has been made involves siting the first 164 E/F aircraft purchased at NAS Lemoore in California. In point of fact, plaintiff's criticism of the FEIS in the instant case is premised in part on the fact that the Navy has gone through the NEPA process and published an EIS for the placement of E/F aircraft at NAS Lemoore. The key distinction between the two situations, however, is that the siting of F/A-18 E/F aircraft at NAS Lemoore is a formally proposed action, while there is not yet a formal proposal to site E/F aircraft at NAS Oceana.

[FN 24] As part of its reply brief, plaintiff submitted two articles from a Norfolk, Virginia, newspaper, purportedly to demonstrate that NAS Oceana is to be the principal base of the E/F version of the F/A-18. Dale Eisman, Congressional Critic Starts New Buzz About Super Hornet's Ability, Virginian-Pilot, Nov. 25, 1998; Dale Eisman, Navy Suspends Tests of New Fighter Due to Engine Crack, Virginian-Pilot, Dec. 12, 1998. However, both articles indicate that there are potentially serious performance problems in the F/A-18 E/F. The November 25, 1998, article also makes it clear that Congress has only approved the purchase of sixty-two aircraft so far. The aircraft's performance problems have also led to a certain degree of congressional opposition. For instance, Senator Russ Feingold asked the Department of Defense to freeze the 1999 appropriation for thirty aircraft until the performance problems are solved. Eisman, Congressional Critic Starts New Buzz About Super Hornet's Ability, Virginian-Pilot, Nov. 25, 1998. Thus, at this early stage of the procurement process, it is far from certain that the Navy will acquire the number of F/A-18 E/F aircraft slated to be stationed at NAS Lemoore, much less the number of aircraft that would be required to replace the F-14 and F/A-18 C/D aircraft at NAS Oceana at some unknown point in the future.

[FN 25] In arguing that the Navy has considered the environmental impact of the E/F at air stations on the West Coast, plaintiff submitted a copy of "Final Environmental Impact Statement for Development of Facilities to Support Basing U.S. Pacific Fleet F/A-18E/F Aircraft on the West Coast of the United States." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 58). That exhibit states that there will be a "less than significant" noise impact at NAS Lemoore as a result of the arrival of the F/A-18 E/F. The exhibit goes on to state

Because it has a more powerful engine, the F/A-8E/F aircraft can maintain a given set of flight conditions at lower power settings than can existing F/A-18C/D aircraft. The F/A-18E/F aircraft is quieter than the existing F/A-18C/D aircraft during takeoffs, climbouts, and high power flight conditions. The F/A-18E/F aircraft is noisier than the existing F/A-18C/D aircraft during landing approaches and low power flight conditions.

Thus, for half the time around an airfield, the E/F is louder than the C/D and for the other half of the time it is quieter than the C/D, probably resulting in a minimal or zero increase in noise impact in the profiles of the NAS Oceana FEIS.

[FN 26] Although the court finds that the FEIS adequately addressed cumulative impacts, even if the court found that the Navy erred, such error would be harmless. The remedy available to the court would be to order the Navy to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement. However, from the record before the court, it is clear that the Navy is already planning to perform such an analysis in the future. Ordering such an analysis at this time would be duplicative and place an onerous burden on the Navy, one that NEPA does not require. North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d at 1131.

9. Compliance With NEPA

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Navy did not comply with the requirements of NEPA in good faith because, contrary to the contention in the FEIS, the Navy made a decision to send all of the F/A-18s to NAS Oceana before the NEPA process was even started. [FN 27] However, the isolated excerpts that plaintiff cites from the administrative record do not support this contention.

[FN 27] Defendant's rejoinder to this argument is that the ultimate decision did not, in fact, place all of the F/A-18s at NAS Oceana, but instead split them up between NAS Oceana and MCAS Beaufort (ARS 2). Although claiming that the ultimate decision was made for political expediency, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, plaintiff offers no proof, either inside or outside the administrative record, to this effect.

In any event, the Navy did not bypass the EIS process to expedite the selection process. In fact, as detailed throughout this opinion, the Navy conducted an exhaustive and thorough study of the environmental impact of the F/A-18 transfer, compiling an administrative record in excess of 51,000 pages in the process and issuing a remarkably detailed FEIS filling three large binders.

Plaintiff then focuses on a lone e-mail to prove that the move of all the aircraft to NAS Oceana was preordained. AR 021784. In the e-mail, Brigadier General Braaten told Lieutenant General Brabham that the Navy was sending analysts to collect information at MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Beaufort for use in the EIS, but that the Navy had no intention of using the Marine Corps' two air stations for the F/A-18s. According to the e-mail, the source for this information was Rear Admiral Lou Smith. Despite the hearsay problem with this document, there is no indication that the Navy had preordained the decision to send all of the F/A-18s to NAS Oceana. None of the individuals mentioned in the e-mail was the agency's final decisionmaker on this issue. At most, this lone e-mail, extracted from an administrative record of over 51,000 pages, merely demonstrates that the Navy had a preferred alternative as it began the FEIS process.

Under NEPA, however, it is often the case that an agency will have a preferred alternative, perhaps even a specific proposal, going into the EIS process. See 40 C.F.R. 1502.2(g); id. at § 1502.4(a). In fact, it would be the unusual case for an agency not to have such a proposal, because it is often the agency's proposed action that trigger's the NEPA process. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 349, 109 S.Ct. 1835. In such a case, NEPA only requires that the ultimate decisionmaker remain open to reconsidering any or all aspects of the proposed action based on the environmental impact identified in the FEIS. See Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 351, 109 S.Ct. 1835 ("NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action"); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1129 (5th Cir.1974) (stating that letters purporting to show agency acted perfunctorily "do not necessarily establish that the ... decision to go ahead with the project would not be reconsidered"). A review of the entire record, and not just a few selective portions cited by plaintiff, reveals that while the Navy may have had a preferred alternative going into the NEPA process, the outcome was not preordained.

In this case, plaintiff points to no evidence in the administrative record indicating that the ultimate decisionmaker, Duncan Holaday, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Facilities), ever concluded before the completion of the FEIS that all of the F/A-18s would be relocated to NAS Oceana. Nor does plaintiff offer any evidence to demonstrate that the Navy's preferred alternative would not be reconsidered based on any environmental concerns raised in the FEIS. Instead, as defendants contend, plaintiff's argument is utterly refuted by the fact that the ROD did not select ARS 1, the Navy's preferred alternative, but, instead, chose an alternative that allowed the Navy to use MCAS Beaufort's excess capacity and already extant F/A-18 training and maintenance facilities.

The court finds that the Navy conducted a thorough and exhaustive analysis of the environmental impact of the F/A-18 transfer and complied with the requirements of NEPA in all respects.

IV. Conclusion

Although plaintiff has engaged in an exercise of "chronic faultfinding," Coalition for Responsible Regional Development v. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398, 400 (4th Cir.1977), plaintiff has failed to prove that the FEIS was inadequate in any respect, or that the decisionmaker did not have the information necessary to make an informed decision. Accordingly, the court finds that the Navy's decision to transfer the F/A-18 aircraft from NAS Cecil Field to NAS Oceana and MCAS Beaufort was not arbitrary and capricious. Defendant's cross- motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction are DENIED.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Opinion and Final Order to counsel for the parties.

It is so ORDERED.