AVIATION NOISE LAW
Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth. v. Centennial Express Airlines
Cite as: 956 P.2d 587


SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

ARAPAHOE COUNTY PUBLIC AIRPORT AUTHORITY, a political subdivision of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,
v.
CENTENNIAL EXPRESS AIRLINES, INC., a Colorado corporation; and GOLDEN EAGLE CHARTERS, INC.,
d/b/a CENTENNIAL EXPRESS AIRWAYS, INC., a Colorado corporation, Respondents.

No. 97SC123

April 13, 1998

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

EN BANC
JUDGMENT REVERSED


COUNSEL:

Brega & Winters, P.C., Ronald S. Loser, Brian A. Magoon, Peter A. Gergely, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner

Bryant & Van Nest, LLC, Mark A. Pottinger, Of Counsel, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents.

CHIEF JUSTICE VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE SCOTT concurs and specially concurs.

JUSTICE BENDER dissents, and JUSTICE MARTINEZ joins in the dissent.

JUSTICE HOBBS does not participate.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v. Centennial Express Airlines, Inc., 942 P.2d 1270 (Colo. App. 1996), to determine whether the court of appeals erred in reversing a permanent injunction entered in favor of the plaintiff, Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority (the Authority), prohibiting the defendant, Centennial Express Airlines, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, Golden Eagle Charters, Inc., d/b/a Centennial Express Airways, Inc. (Centennial Express), from conducting scheduled air carrier service in and out of Centennial Airport (Centennial). We reverse.

I.

Centennial was built in 1967 to serve the growing aviation needs of the Denver metropolitan region and has since become one of the largest and busiest general aviation facilities in the country. [FN 1] Centennial is located fourteen miles southeast of downtown Denver and sits on approximately 1,200 acres of land in Arapahoe and Douglas Counties. In 1975, Arapahoe County established the Authority pursuant to the Public Airport Authority Law, sections 41-3-101 to -108, 17 C.R.S. (1973), to own and operate Centennial as a political subdivision of the State. The Authority owns all of the land and facilities at Centennial except for two runways which it leases from Arapahoe County.

FN 1. In 1988, Centennial ranked as the twenty-eighth busiest airport in the United States. One year later, Centennial was fourth nationally in based aircraft. In 1995, Centennial was the second busiest general aviation airport in the country.

To fund airport construction and operations, the Authority has accepted approximately $30.1 million in federal grants. As a condition to accepting these grants and pursuant to federal law, the Authority has given its assurance that it "will make its airport available as an airport for public use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination, to all types, kinds, and classes of aeronautical uses." A separate assurance provides that the Authority "may prohibit or limit any given type, kind, or class of aeronautical use of the airport if such action is necessary for the safe operation of the airport or necessary to serve the civil aviation needs of the public."

Local, regional, and national planning schemes designate Centennial as a general aviation reliever airport for Denver's primary air carrier airports, Stapleton International (Stapleton), which closed in February of 1995 and Denver International (DIA), which opened upon Stapleton's closure. Locally, resolutions passed by the Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County in 1966 approved funding for the construction of a general aviation airport. Newspaper accounts of open meetings held following this funding approval indicate that county officials hoped to lure new industry and expand the county's tax base by building an airport to "serve general aviation, not scheduled carriers or military planes." A new airport would also ease general aviation overcrowding at Stapleton. In one news report, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) area director proclaimed that the airport was "a much needed reliever terminal for general aviation."

Regionally, the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), a planning organization of county and municipal governments, has adopted several aviation plans that guide the development and operation of airports in the Denver area. Specifically, the 2010 Regional Aviation System Plan (2010 Plan), which was published by DRCOG in 1989, provides that Stapleton is the only commercial air carrier airport in the region and designates Centennial "as a non-commercial passenger, transport-category, general aviation reliever airport." Similarly, the Regional Aviation System Planning Program Data File, which was published by DRCOG in 1991, provides that Stapleton is the "air carrier facility for the Denver region" and categorizes Centennial "as a non-commercial passenger, transport category, G.A. reliever." [FN 2]

[FN 2] In November of 1995, after the facts giving rise to this dispute arose, DRCOG published the 2020 Regional Aviation System Plan (2020 Plan) to update the 2010 Plan. The 2020 Plan refers to Centennial as a "transport-category, general aviation airport, [that] is a designated reliever to DIA."

Nationally, the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS), which was presented to Congress by the Secretary of Transportation in 1991, does not include Centennial in its summary of Colorado's primary and commercial service airports. Instead, the NPIAS lists Centennial as a reliever airport intended to alleviate general aviation congestion at Denver's primary commercial airport through 1999.

Due to its planned role as a general aviation reliever and strong opposition from citizens who live near the airport, scheduled passenger service has never been authorized at Centennial. While fixed-base air taxi and charter flights are permitted, Centennial's master plan, which was published in 1981, provides that air taxi, charter flights, and military use constitute less than one percent of the airport's total operations. Because scheduled passenger service has never been permitted, Centennial presently operates without a terminal, baggage system, or passenger security system.

Despite Centennial's lack of facilities, private efforts have been made to bring scheduled passenger service to the airport. In response, the Authority has increased efforts to prohibit scheduled passenger service. On July 21, 1993, the Authority sent a letter to the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) asserting that the Authority did not have to approve applications for scheduled passenger service and asking USDOT for its opinion on the issue. On September 4, 1993, the Authority also amended the "Minimum Standards for Commercial Aeronautical Activities" (the Standards) governing operations at Centennial. These Standards now define "Airport Purpose" as

(Emphasis added.)

On December 20, 1994, Centennial Express began scheduled passenger service out of Centennial to Dalhart, Texas. Centennial Express has a valid air carrier certificate issued by the FAA. [FN 3] At the time of its maiden flight, Centennial Express was aware of the Authority's ban on scheduled passenger service but chose to delay notifying the Authority until the return flight from Dalhart. Centennial Express also issued a press release announcing that it would soon provide scheduled passenger service from Centennial to Amarillo, Colorado Springs, Grand Junction, and other Western Slope airports in 1995. Additionally, Centennial Express planned to begin regular jet flights from Colorado Springs to Chicago, Kansas City, Houston, Dallas, Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.

[FN 3] The FAA certificate authorized Centennial Express to carry up to 30 passengers for four scheduled round trips per week, per destination, in aircraft weighing less than 75,000 pounds.

The following day, the Authority filed suit in Arapahoe County District Court (the district court) seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing Centennial Express from conducting scheduled passenger service out of Centennial. On December 22, 1994, the district court granted the Authority's request for a temporary restraining order, concluding in part that

On December 23, 1994, more than seventeen months after the Authority's initial request, USDOT responded to the Authority's letter as to whether it could ban scheduled passenger service at Centennial. In relevant part, the USDOT's letter provides as follows:

Later, the opinion letter states that the Authority's

On January 10, 1995, after conducting several hearings, the district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Centennial Express from conducting scheduled passenger service out of Centennial. [FN 4] Centennial Express appealed and also filed a complaint with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). [FN 5] The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling, concluding that the Authority's regulation prohibiting scheduled passenger service was preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994). The court of appeals also held that the district court should have left the question of whether the Authority could prohibit scheduled passenger service to the federal administrative agencies' primary jurisdiction.

[FN 4] At a January 5, 1995, hearing, the parties stipulated that the district court would rule on the issue of permanent injunctive relief in order to expedite this case for appeal. For this reason, no preliminary injunction was issued in this case.

[FN 5] Centennial Express's FAA complaint was the second challenging the Authority's ban on scheduled passenger service. The first complaint had been filed by an individual who is not a party to this action. Both complaints are still pending.

II.

At the outset, we must determine whether this court should defer to the federal agencies' holding concurrent jurisdiction over this case. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, or the deference doctrine, calls for judicial deference in cases involving technical questions of fact uniquely within an agency's expertise and experience, or in cases where uniformity and consistency require administrative discretion. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 652 F.2d 503, 519 n.14 (5th Cir. 1981); Great Western Sugar Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 661 P.2d 684, 690 (Colo. App. 1982). No fixed formula exists for deciding when to invoke this doctrine, but it should be utilized reluctantly where the issue is strictly a legal one that is within the conventional competence of the courts. See Great Western Sugar, 661 P.2d at 690.

The issues in this case do not involve complex questions of fact. Rather, we have been asked to consider whether the district court properly enjoined Centennial Express from conducting scheduled passenger service out of Centennial. As defenses, Centennial Express claims that (1) the Authority's regulation prohibiting scheduled passenger service at Centennial is preempted by federal law and (2) the ban on scheduled passenger service violates the terms of the Authority's federal grant assurances. In our view, these legal and interpretive questions do not "go beyond the understanding of judges" or lay "at the heart of the task assigned the agency by Congress." See Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 580-81 (1st Cir. 1979).

Additionally, the FAA has yet to rule on either of the complaints despite the fact that they were filed more than three years ago. Similarly, although the USDOT opinion letter alludes to "initiating, early [in 1995], a process to obtain a full range of views on" its policy regarding individual airport participation in regional airport planning, we have no indication from the parties or USDOT that such efforts have begun. Because there is a strong public interest in resolving this case promptly, we refuse to defer to administrative action which is of "uncertain aid and uncertain speed." See id. at 581. [FN 6]

[FN 6] Contrary to the court of appeals, we do not view New England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 883 F.2d 157, 171 (1st Cir. 1989), as dispositive here. In that case, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in ruling on the merits of a case involving the imposition of landing fees at Boston's Logan Airport when the same issue was pending before the FAA. In the Second Circuit's view, the following federal actions, in addition to an FAA complaint, justified deferring to the FAA in that case: (1) the Secretary of Transportation had ordered a formal investigation into the complaint; and (2) the United States, as amicus curiae, had urged the district court to issue an injunction preserving the status quo until the USDOT's investigation was complete. See id. In this case, we are aware of no formal investigation into the FAA complaints and have received no indication from the federal government that reviewing the merits of this case is, in its view, inappropriate.

Centennial Express also points to the USDOT opinion letter in arguing that deference is warranted in this case. In Banner Advertising, Inc. v. People, 868 P.2d 1077, 1083 (Colo. 1994), we addressed the level of deference we must afford an opinion letter issued by the FAA. Specifically, we explained:

Id. Contrary to Banner, where we chose to defer to the agency's letter, we believe the USDOT's opinion letter in this case does not require deference. First, the letter is brief, contains no federal preemption analysis, and fails to cite any federal cases for its propositions. Second, the letter is inconclusive because it states that the Authority submitted "insufficient information" on the impact scheduled passenger service would have at Centennial. Third, because the opinion letter is only persuasive authority, it is not binding on this court. See id.

In this case, Centennial Express began scheduled passenger service in clear defiance of the Authority's regulations, before the USDOT's opinion letter was issued, and before filing its FAA complaint. Nevertheless, Centennial Express asserts that even though it has disregarded valid regulations passed pursuant to state law, we must defer to the federal agencies' concurrent jurisdiction. We disagree. If we defer to the federal agencies, we would affirm Centennial Express's course of conduct and foreclose the Authority's only avenue of relief. This would allow future airport users to unilaterally conduct and continue operations in violation of airport rules so long as they implicate federal jurisdiction in some way. Under these circumstances, we refuse to defer to the federal agencies' concurrent jurisdiction.

III.

Centennial Express argues that the ban on scheduled passenger service is preempted by federal law. We disagree.

Congress radically altered the character of commercial aviation when it amended the Federal Aviation Act and deregulated the airline industry pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA). See Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705. In so doing, Congress determined that market forces were better suited for promoting efficiency, innovation, low prices, variety, and quality in the air transportation industry. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992). However, the absence of federal regulation caused concern in Congress that individual states would pass inconsistent and conflicting laws regulating the airline industry. See H.R. Rep. 95-1211, at 15-16 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3752; see also Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 320-21 (E.D. Mich. 1993). Consequently, the ADA included a provision that preempted all state laws relating to the rates, routes, or services of an interstate air carrier. See 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). Currently, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (the ADA preemption provision) provides that a political subdivision of a state "may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." [FN 7]

[FN 7] Congress reenacted Title 49 in 1994. Previously, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) provided in relevant part that "no state . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any carrier." Although the language of this statute differs slightly from 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), Congress intended the revision to make no substantive change. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 n.1 (1995). Therefore, even though many of the cases cited in this opinion interpret 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), this opinion refers to both § 1305(a)(1) and § 41713(b)(1) as the ADA preemption provision.

Two cases from the United States Supreme Court offer guidance on the scope of the ADA preemption provision. In Morales, several airlines filed suit against the State of Texas seeking injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of state regulations pertaining to airline fare advertising. The airlines argued that the regulations were preempted by the ADA preemption provision. Relying upon cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted a similarly worded preemption provision in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Court determined that the ADA preemption provision expressed a broad preemptive purpose that included all "State enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline rates, routes, or services." Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-84; see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 (1995). The Morales Court noted, however, that preemption was inappropriate where the state action affects airline rates, routes, and services "in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner." See Morales, 504 U.S. at 390; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 224.

In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-56 (1995), the Supreme Court explained that it may have interpreted the "relate to" language in prior ERISA cases too broadly. [FN 8]

[FN 8] Although Travelers does not concern aviation law, Morales explains the connection to ERISA cases as follows:

    [W]e have held that a state law relates to an employee benefit plan, and is pre-empted by ERISA, if it has a connection with, or reference to, such a plan. Since the relevant language of the ADA is identical, we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here.

Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Travelers is therefore highly instructive on the Supreme Court's current approach towards interpreting "identical" language in the ADA preemption provision. i>Id.

Specifically, the Court explained:

Id. at 655 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court explained that it must address ERISA preemption cases "with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." Id. at 654. With this presumption in mind, the Court then explained that it "simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive." Id. at 656.

Despite the broad reach the Morales Court gave the ADA preemption provision, the Travelers decision establishes a less literal method for determining whether state regulations concerning aviation are preempted. Specifically, Travelers counsels that we should first presume "that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." Id. at 654. Then, we must review the objectives of the statute in defining "the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive." Id. at 656.

Turning to the facts of this case, we believe that the Authority's ban on scheduled passenger service is not preempted. Because the regulation concerns an area of local and regional planning, it will not lead to inconsistent or conflicting state regulations. [FN 9] Therefore, the regulation does not undermine the purpose of the ADA preemption provision.

[FN 9] Besides planning Centennial's operations on a local level, the Authority's ban on scheduled passenger service also reflects the airport's regional role as a general aviation reliever for Denver's primary commercial airport. Other federal statutes indicate a willingness to cooperate with and defer to this type of local and regional aviation planning. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(8) (1994); 49 U.S.C. § 47101(g) (1994). Specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 47101(g) provides in pertinent part that

    the Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate with State and local officials in developing airport plans and programs that are based on overall transportation needs. The airport plans and programs shall be developed in coordination with other transportation planning and considering comprehensive long-range land-use plans and overall social, economic, environmental, system performance, and energy conservation objectives. The process of developing airport plans and programs shall be continuing, cooperative, and comprehensive to the degree appropriate to the complexity of the transportation problems.


Continued in Part Two