(b) Capacity of W-1W Plan. As discussed above, the FAA's analysis of the capacity of proposed W-1W is fundamentally flawed -- W-1W will not achieve the claimed arrival capacity unless air traffic controllers disregard the safety requirements of their profession, which they will not do.
(c) Inadequate Consideration of Alternatives to W-1W. The FAA is charged with considering "reasonable alternatives." Yet the S-1 and NE-1a plans were excluded based upon unreasonable and incorrect criteria and assessments. For example, NE-1a was excluded from consideration because it did not provide simultaneous independent arrival capability (since the runways were not spaced at least 3400 feet apart). NATCA contends that if properly simulated, NE-1a would have greater capacity and delay-reducing capability than W-1W. Despite the fact that the W-1W runways are spaced sufficiently apart to permit independent arrivals in poor weather, in practice W-1W cannot take advantage of this spacing (because of the arrival-to-departure dependencies that are created by the long runway threshold staggers). In examining the Ne-1a plan, the planners ignored the following aspects of NE-1a, apparently to artificially increase delays under NE-1a and make it appear less desirable:
(1) Reduced departure delays by departing on runways spaced 2500 feet apart. Maximum efficiency for departures can be achieved when departure runways are spaced at least 2500 feet apart, as are the two outboard parallel runways in NE-1a. Yet Exhibit D-r of the MPS assumes that NE-1a departures during peak departure times used the two closely spaced runways, 1300 feet apart. This assumption artificially increases NE-1a delays and is not consistent with standard air traffic control practices.
(2) Increased arrival capacity. The FAA addressed the possibility of increased arrival capability on runways spaced 2500 feet apart, as in the NE-1a design, in its video, "Capacity initiatives." In this video an offset instrument landing system is used to portray techniques for independent arrival operations to runways spaced 2500 feet apart. In Exhibit D-4 of the MPS, this initiative was ignored and replaced by less efficient dependent arrivals during 30% of the airport operating time. Ignoring this FAA initiative artificially increased the apparent landing delays under the NE-1a plan. In fact, according to NATCA's calculations NE-1a provides independent arrivals about 94% of the time while W-1W provides independent arrivals only about 54% of the time. Therefore, NE-1a should have been retained for further review because it provides independent landing operations more frequently than does W-1W.
(3) Addition of bypass taxiways. Because the proposed NE-1a runway would be added north of the two present parallel runways, aircraft might need to cross two runways en route to the airline terminal. NATCA proposed that bypass taxiways be constructed behind runway 30L and 12C (12L at the present airport)to pass traffic around the end of one of the two present runways. With this addition, aircraft would only need to cross one runway en route to the new runway, thereby reducing taxi delays. The MPS ignored this NE-1a improvement so that taxi delays could be artificially increased, discrediting the NE-1a plan. The significance of the FAA's handling of alternative runways is demonstrated by the following comparison of arrivals per hour:
Runway Configuration | Arrivals/ hour |
| Present St. Louis configuration | 48-54 |
| W-1W configuration | 45-51 |
| NE-1a configuration | 60 |
| Standard parallel runway configuration (like S-1) | 66 |
In light of this comparison, exclusion of S-1 and NE-1a alternatives constituted a violation of the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
NEPA requires environmental impact statements to include "a detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . (iii) alternatives to the proposed action . . ." 42 U.S.C. §4332(C). This statement is not a minor part of the EIS. The regulations implementing NEPA provide that the evaluation of alternatives
Is the heart of the environmental impact statement. Based on the information and analysis presented in the sections on the Affected Environment (§1502.15) and the Environmental Consequences (§1502.16), it should present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decision maker and the public.
40 C.F.R. §1502.14 (1996). In order to implement this critical requirement, an EIS must:
Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.
Id. at §1502.14(a) "It is `absolutely essential to the NEPA process that the decision maker be provided with a detailed and careful analysis of the relative environmental merits and demerits of the proposed action and possible alternatives, a requirement we have characterized as "the linchpin of the entire impact statement.'" Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273, 1286 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2510 (1997) (quoting NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 1975)). "The EIS thus `helps insure the integrity of the process of decision,' providing a basis for comparing the environmental problems raised by the proposed project with the difficulties involved in the alternatives." Id. at 1286 (quoting Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973)).
An agency's "choice of which alternatives to discuss and the extent to which the EIS must discuss them [is reviewed] under the `rule of reason.'" Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, No. 97-3282 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 364 *36 (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 1999) (quoting City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. United States, 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997)). Under this "rule of reason," courts "consider whether the EIS 'has been compiled in good faith' and adequately sets forth sufficient information to allow the decision maker to consider alternatives and make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the environment against the benefits of the proposed action." Id. (quoting County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977)).
The FAA excluded the S-1 and NE-1a plans on the basis of miscalculations and misinformation and distorted the level of "improvement" of W-1W over existing capacity at Lambert. It, therefore, failed to comply with the EIS requirement of good faith.
(d) Exclusion of Input by Controllers. NATCA is the sole representative of the controllers at Lambert-St. Louis. It speaks for the professionals directly responsible for the daily operation of the airport and surrounding airspace. The least senior controller in this work force has more than seven years of direct experience in controlling air traffic at a very busy facility. Many of NATCA's members have transferred from such hubs as Atlanta-Hartsfield and Chicago-O'Hare. As a group, the NATCA Local TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) averages more than twenty years experience. Many member have backgrounds in staff and supervisory capacities and boast more than thirty years of direct hands-on-knowledge of all elements within the National Airspace System. They bring to the work force a level of experience exceedingly rich in operational insight. NATCA's professional opinions regarding airport expansion are based on technical considerations rather than the constraints of any local, regional, or national political concerns.
The planners of the Lambert expansion claim to have included controllers in the planning process, but the FAA administrative personnel with whom they consulted were not directly involved with the operational complexities of air traffic control at Lambert. Many of the proposed procedures in W-1W that NATCA finds most objectionable could have been discussed and resolved prior to the issuance of the MPS and FEIS had NATCA been a full participant in the planning process from the beginning. To design an airport without NATCA's input in the Technical Working Group that examined the technical merits of various plans and procedures was seriously irresponsible.
"Real-time simulation" is the term given to simulations that utilize air traffic controllers seated at radar scopes controlling computer-generated targets. These simulations represent the most realistic method to evaluate human factors and controller reactions in an air traffic control environment. Real-time simulations are used to train controllers in new procedures, and therefore would have to be implemented at Lambert before W-1W could be used in any event because W-1W requires controller operations which have never been used. Testing the FAA's computer-based assumptions in a real-time simulation would be a simple matter, and it should be done before a final commitment is made to build W-1W.
Both NATCA and the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) proposed that the FAA conduct such a study at the FAA's Technical Center at Atlantic City, New Jersey. This study would provide data that would indicate whether the W-1W plan could be operated in the manner described in the MPS. NATCA strongly believes that the real-time study would validate their contention that the W-1W plan would be extremely difficult to operate and would produce little arrival capacity gains in poor weather conditions, particularly in the predominant west flow. Initially, the Air Traffic Services division of the FAA in Washington supported such a study. However, as political pressures mounted on the FAA to approve W-1W without further study, certain elements within the FAA reversed themselves and dropped their support for the study. Contractually, FAA management is bound to negotiate any procedural changes with NATCA anyway. Real-time simulations are conducted routinely to resolve any problems that may arise from these changes. These simulations are usually done locally, but sometimes complexities require FAA Tech Center involvement. By deferring this issue to their successors in 2004, today's managers can effectively avoid any culpability or fallout for a poor airport plan. The cost of performing the study, in terms of both time and money, is nominal in relation to the overall project. And, again, because new procedures are involved, it will have to be done eventually anyway.
The capacity and delay numbers for W-1W contained in the FEIS were produced using a SIMMOD simulation analysis. SIMMOD, like any simulation, is based on numerous input variables. The accuracy of SIMMOD analysis, therefore, depends on the accuracy of the assumptions on which it is based. The accuracy of these assumptions is particularly important with respect to Lambert because over the years air traffic controllers have developed complex, unique procedures for handling the increasing numbers of operations using the existing airfield. In addition, it is important because implementation of the proposed W-1W alternative will result in a highly unusual runway configuration requiring the development of additional non-standard operational procedures.
SIMMOD analyses based on operational assumptions that do not approximate reality produce data that is useless and misleading. The SIMMOD analyses that were performed for the MPS and incorporated into the FEIS supported the airport consultant's figure of 40 arrivals per hour for CRDA, but simply counting the actual arrivals at Lambert would have yielded an accurate -- and higher -- number. The FAA should be required to perform a real-time simulation before $2.6 billion is committed to W-1W in any event. That is particularly true where, as here, the SIMMOD analyses that were performed were so clearly inaccurate.
CONCLUSION
The selection of W-1W by the FAA should be reversed, and the review of expansion options for Lambert reopened for the following reasons:
2. The FAA arbitrarily and unreasonably failed to consider alternatives to W-1W such as S-1 and NE-1a by distorting data concerning these alternatives.
3. The FAA excluded NATCA from technical review of the runway options.
4. The FAA arbitrarily reversed itself and refused to conduct a real-time simulation to test its computer-generated conclusions on the capabilities of W-1W, when a real-time simulation will have to be performed anyway.
DEVEREUX, MURPHY, STRILER,
BRICKEY & SHER, L.L.C.
By:________________________________
Richard P. Sher
Stephen C. Murphy
10 S. Brentwood, Suite 215
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
(314) 721-1516
(314) 721-4434 (fax)
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
National Air Traffic Controllers
Association, Local T-75